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ABSTRACT
OPERATION BUMPY ROAD
THE ROLE OF ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE AND THE U.S. NAVY
IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION
John P. Madden
Old Dominion University
Director: Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr.

The Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 was a political
and military fiasco.

President John F. Kennedy inherited

the plan when he took office in January 1961.

Even though

there was a low probability of success, Kennedy still
approved the operation.

Because of the failure at the Bay

of Pigs Kennedy lost faith in the Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] and the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS].

Admiral

Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], endorsed the
need to eliminate Fidel Castro.

The role of the CIA is a

well-worn subject, but what was the role of Admiral Burke
and the U.S. Navy in the Bay of Pigs operation?

This review

is an historical perspective of the role of Burke and the
Navy in the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs
invasion.

It shows that Burke and the Navy did what they

could to make a poor plan work, but it was not enough.

The

key failure was that it was a civilian-run operation without
sufficient military support and involvement.
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INTRODUCTION
"Operation Bumpy Road" was the code name for the
United States Navy's role in the Bay of Pigs operation.

The

Bay of Pigs operation was originally intended to be a covert
operation to invade Cuba and topple the Castro regime using
Cuban exiles sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency
[CIA].

American military participation was to be kept at a

minimum to avoid linking the United States to the operation.
Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy went so
far as to direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] to stay out
of the actual conduct of the operation.

Yet, the United

States Navy still expected to be called on to provide
support if needed and did become involved in the operation
and rescue.

For those involved in the operation it became a

"bumpy road" to follow.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of

Naval Operations [CNO], and Admiral Robert L. Dennison,
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, [CINCLANT], foresaw the
need for prior naval preparation in the event that American
forces were directed to provide coastal protection of the
operation, land troops on the beach, or conduct rescue
missions.
Admiral Burke and the United States Navy wanted the
Bay of Pigs operation to succeed.

Because the Navy

1

L
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supported the decision to remove Fidel Castro from power,
naval decisions were made and actions were taken to help
make the operation succeed.

Even after receiving specific

presidential directives to limit their involvement, the Navy
did what it could to make the plan work, but it was not
enough.
This study provides a historical perspective
describing the fall of Fulgencio Batista and subsequent rise
of Fidel Castro.

It traces the rise of Castro and the

Eisenhower Administration's reaction to the new threat in
Cuba.

It explains the thoughts and reasons behind the

decisions made by senior administration officials.

It

describes the administration's reactions when it became
obvious that Castro was developing closer ties with the
communists.

The shift in relations between Cuba and the

Soviet Union was a major factor in the development of the
Bay of Pigs operation.

Eisenhower felt that it was

necessary for a plan to be created by the CIA, using no
overt American military force to oust Castro from power.
Although Eisenhower's directions were clear, the CIA was not
in a position to draft a plan without assistance from the
military.
work.

Military guidance was necessary to make the plan

The failure to bring the JCS and Navy into the plan

at its earliest stages created a lack of military expertise
in the developmental stages of the operation.
Admiral Burke, a naval hero dating to the Solomon
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Islands campaign during World War II, was the most outspoken
member of the JCS.

He was deeply interested in the rise of

Castro because of Cuba's strategic importance and the
security of the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

The

Navy used Guantanamo as a site for ships to receive
"refresher training."
time conditions.

The training tested the crews in war

Damage control, engineering casualty

control, command and control, seamanship, and gunnery drills
were conducted on a daily basis.

A small detachment of

American naval personnel was assigned to Guantanamo to
provide the training and logistical support for the fleet.
But, most important, Guantanamo remained a key strategic
link to Cuba for the U.S. Navy.

Guantanamo Bay was a deep

draft port capable of handling ships from frigates to
aircraft carriers.

The base compound included a shipyard

and refueling facility.

Guantanamo was a vast naval complex

capable of posing a serious threat to Castro's regime if the
U.S. decided to use it for the launching-point of an
invasion.
This study provides an explanation of the role Admiral
Burke and the JCS played in reviewing the various plans
offered by the CIA.

Were Admiral Burke and the Navy active

participants or passive bystanders?

This study shows that

Admiral Burke and the Navy were opposed to the Castro regime
because of the strategic implications of a Soviet ally so
close to the United States.

The Navy saw a need to remove

Lk
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Castro from power in order to alleviate strategic planning
problems in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
The CIA conducted the operation only after the plan
had been modified so many times that it did not resemble the
original idea submitted to the JCS for their review.

This

study demonstrates that indecision in Washington because of
political uncertainties forced modifications that almost
guaranteed the plan's failure.

The JCS, acting on

directions from the White House, could only review and make
recommendations.

At the fleet level Admiral Dennison did

what he could to make the operation succeed, but it was not
enough.

With his hands tied by presidential directives,

Dennison could not commit his total forces to make the plan
work.

The breakdown in the relationship between the

President and the military and the subsequent refusal to use
military force in support of the revolutionaries were the
crucial reasons for the failure of the operation.

The

Administration's failure to establish a realistic and
clearly attainable objective forced the military into a "nowin" situation.

As a result, the operation failed miserably

and the Navy was asked to conduct the evacuation of the
remaining forces from the beach.
The deteriorating relationship between Cuba and the
United States is well documented but very little has been
written of the Navy's role in the Bay of Pigs Operation.
Narratives such as Mario Lazo's, Dagger in the Heart:
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American Foreign Policy Failures in Cuba. Richard Nixon's,
Six Crises. Phillip Bonsai's, Cuba, Castro and the United
States. Maurice Halperin's, The Rise and Decline of Fidel
Castro. and Richard Welch's, Response to Revolution;

The

U.S. and the Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961. are works which
detail the fall of Batista, the rise of Castro, and the
impact on American foreign policy.1 The CIA's role in
covert operations has also received considerable attention
from historians and journalists.

Secrets. Spies, and

Scholars, by Ray Cline, The Real CIA, by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
The CIA's Secret Operations, by Harry Rositzke, and The
Aaencv: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, by John Ranelagh,
provide informative details of the role the CIA has played
as a tool of government officials in seeking foreign policy
obj ectives.2
To date, very few Navy people involved in the
operation have been willing to discuss or release
1Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart: American Foreign
Policy Failures in Cuba (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968);
Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City: Doubleday,
1967); Phillip Bonsai, Cuba. Castro and the United States
(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); Maurice
Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press, 1972); Richard Welch, Response to
Revolution: The U.S. and the Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1985).
^ay Cline, Secrets. Spies, and Scholars (New York:
Washington: Acropolis Books, 1976); Lyman Kirkpatrick, The
Real CIA (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Harry Rositzke, The
CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader’s Digest Press,
1977) ; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
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information concerning the Bay of Pigs.

Some openly state

that they don't want to talk about the operation.

There is

little written material that has been declassified
describing the naval involvement in the invasion.

The

defeat at the Bay of Pigs was a "black eye" for many naval
personnel.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, as CKO, was responsible

for keeping the Chairman of the JCS and the President
informed of the naval problems associated with the
operation.

Burke has been criticized by historians for

failing to keep Kennedy informed of the perils of the
planning and execution of the assault.

Records concerning

Burke and the Navy's role remain quite sensitive.

The Navy

is still unwilling to declassify most of the information
concerning the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Following the operation Kennedy asked General Maxwell
Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, to come out of
retirement to chair a committee to look into the reasons for
the failure at the Bay of Pigs.

The resulting Taylor

Committee Report gives a detailed description of the
operation and some of the views of the participants.

The

third, and most recently declassified, section goes into
great detail explaining the Navy's role through JCS messages
and directives.
The references, though limited, show that Admiral
Burke and the Navy did what they could to make a poor plan
work.

The Bay of Pigs operation was a military operation
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developed and conducted by civilians with little assistance
from the military.

Unfortunately, governmental limitations

did not allow the military to assist in such a way as to let
the plan succeed.

The invasion failed miserably and the CIA

and the JCS were held accountable.
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CHAPTER ONE
FRIEND OR FOE:

THE RISE OF FIDEL CASTRO

On 1 January 1959, Fulgencio Batista, President of
Cuba, was ousted from power by Fidel Castro.

The Batista

regime created several problems for American foreign policy
makers.

Batista was a totalitarian dictator.

Many in the

United States felt that it was necessary to remove Batista
from power if a democratic society was going to exist in
Cuba.

Fidel Castro was seen as the new blood that would

implement radical changes to restore democracy in a country
torn by civil strife.1
In the United States the rise of Castro was accepted
with guarded optimism and wary skepticism.

Since the early

days of 1953 his struggle to power was carefully observed in
Washington.

On 26 July 1953 Castro and a small group of his

followers attacked the Moncado Barracks in Santiago.

The

unsuccessful attempt to force the removal of Batista was the
foundation of the "26th of July Movement."

Castro returned

information concerning the fall of Batista and rise of
Castro was primarily drawn from Foreign Relations of the
United States TFRUS1: 1955-1957. vol. VI, Caribbean.
(Washington: USGPO, 1957), and Dwight D. Eisenhower's, The
White House Years: Waging Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1965).

8
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from exile in Mexico in a highly publicized landing in
Oriente province in 1956.

Castro's revolution was based on

agrarian reform throughout the countryside of Cuba.

Castro

stressed programs intended to aid the oppressed and
impoverished, which simultaneously reduced the dominance and
influence of big businesses in Cuba.

These programs

included granting land to small planters and peasants, with
compensation to land owners, a more equitable share of the
cane crop to planters, profit-sharing, confiscation of all
illegally attained property, agricultural cooperatives to
share equipment, cold storage, and the creation of a uniform
direction in cultivation and breeding.

Most alarming,

though, Castro encouraged the nationalization of major
corporations such as the electric and telephone companies.2
Castro and his followers hid in the Sierra Maestra
jungles and conducted intermittent guerrilla operations
against Batista strongholds.

In addition to striking out

against Batista, Castro rallied popular support for his
revolution from the lower class workers and peasants.

His

promises of popular agrarian reform provided hope for the
people.

The numbers of communists within his movement grew

as the Cuban populace rejected the harsh and corrupt Batista
rule.
2FRUS. 866n.
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The Eisenhower Administration was split.

The Batista

government was corrupt and had strong ties to American
businesses, such as the United Fruit Company, the
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, Esso, and
Texaco.

If Castro came to power there was uncertainty

concerning which direction he was going to lead Cuba.
Castro appeared to be anti-communist, yet, he accepted
communists within his inner circle of advisers.

His

brother, Raul, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, his closest
adviser, were confirmed communists.

Some in the State

Department saw Castro as an evil necessary to remove Batista
from power.

Others in the Central Intelligence Agency

[CIA], like Director Allen Dulles, and Deputy Director
Richard Bissell, Admiral Arleigh Burke of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff [JCS], and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, were
convinced that Castro would move quickly into the communist
camp once he consolidated his power base within Cuba.3
While Castro's movements were cautiously observed by
administration officials, Batista remained a thorn in the
side of policy makers.

Executions of his political

opponents were common.

Although his tactics were brutal,

Batista was an ally of the United States.

The United States

tolerated Batista's abuses of power because he supported
American interests in Cuba and abroad.

Following Batista's

3Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging
Peace. 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), 520n.
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11
assumption of power in 1952, Cuba broke relations with the
Soviet Union, outlawed the communist party, supported the
United Nations' efforts in Korea, and was a major supporter
of the CIA-sponsored overthrow of Guatemalan strongman
Jacobo Arbenz in 1954.

Despite his support of the United

States, Batista's dictatorial regime fomented discontent
throughout Cuba.

As popular uprisings spread, Batista's

stranglehold of Cuba became more oppressive.

Insurrection

was rampant.4 The Eisenhower Administration was in a
quandary on how to handle the Cuban situation.
Principal opposition groups in Cuba included Fidel
Castro's "26th of July Movement," the Sanchez Arango
organization, the Revolutionary Directorate Federation, and
university students under Jose Antonio Echevarria.

Fidel

Castro's movement was the primary opposition group capable
of providing a substantial threat to Batista.

In October

1956, the American embassy in Havana warned the State
Department that popular uprisings and insurrections were
probable by the start of the year.5 Political murders
continued with alarming frequency.
its opposition.

The government blamed

The opposition cited the murders as

examples of the government's use of the police and military
to brutally oppress civil liberties throughout Cuba.
4"U.S.-Cuba Relations Frequently Stormy," New York
Times. 4 January 1961, 8.
5FRUS. 835-37.

k
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Senior government officials in Washington sent
conflicting signals to Havana.

The U.S. government objected

to Batista's thuggery but turned its back while American
military goods continued to be shipped to Havana.

In

January 1957 the American embassy in Havana recommended that
the U.S. officially protest Batista's use of brute force in
squelching opposition and civil rights.

Secretary of state

John Foster Dulles frowned upon Batista's use of murder and
intimidation, but refrained from getting directly involved.
On 16 February 1957 Dulles brushed aside recommendations
that the U.S. protest, because he did not want to be accused
of meddling in the affairs of another nation.

Dulles

encouraged the use of diplomacy, discretion, and sound
judgment to deal with Batista.6 The failure of the
administration to control Batista's use of American-supplied
weaponry against the populace had crucial consequences in
later dealings with the Castro regime.
Anti-Batista sentiment in Cuba grew in the summer of
1957.

Memorandums and telegrams from the embassy in Havana

repeated earlier warnings of growing popular dissent and
harsher government reprisals.

In September 1957 Ambassador

Earl T. Smith notified the Secretary of State that Batista
used American-supplied F-47s and B-26s to put down the
revolt at Cienfuegos.

Some of the equipment was provided

6Ibid., 840-41n.
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through the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, signed in
March 1952.

One of the stipulations in this agreement was

that the weapons could not be used by a government to
suppress internal unrest.

Again, the response of the United

States was to tread softly and defer decisions on future
arms shipments to Batista.7
By late 1957 anti-Batista tensions were acute.

The

Eisenhower Administration began discussing possible
alternatives to Batista.

American short and long-term

interests in Cuba were threatened by continued support of
the Batista regime.

Opposition grew day by day and if the

government fell there would be chaos, anarchy, and a great
deal of uncertainty.

U.S. diplomats had to prepare

contingencies for the possible fall of Batista.

Cuban

political uncertainty made the atmosphere ripe for civil
unrest.

On 21 November 1957 the State Department

recommended three possible courses of action in dealing with
the Cuban situation.

The first option called for the U.S.

to remain aloof and allow the "chips to fall."

In this

instance unrest would be allowed to grow and Batista would
have to fend for himself.

The second option consisted of a

total embargo of military goods to Batista if he failed to
stop the brutality and oppression.

The third option

consisted of talcing a firm stand in dealings with anti7Ibid., 845.
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14
Batista elements in the U.S. and Cuba.

If the U.S. showed

interest in the opposition groups, anti-American hostilities
might be avoided if one of those groups came to power.8
Publicly, the Eisenhower Administration opted to
follow the charter of the Organization of American States
[OAS] which prohibited the intervention of one country in
the internal affairs of another.

At times, Ambassador Smith

favored conciliatory measures towards Batista because
Americans had millions of dollars invested in Cuba.

If

American interests were to be protected, the U.S. had to
support anti-communist efforts in Cuba.9 By the summer of
1958 support for Batista in Cuba waned.

Privately, the

administration began seeking a successor favorable to
American interests.

Castro received more support from the

Cuban population than did any other opposition leader.
Batista continued to receive support from the upper class
and the military.
Castro's movement.

The middle class slowly moved towards
Some of Eisenhower's advisers urged him

to continue supporting Batista.

Other advisers advocated

that the rise of Castro was imminent.

Still others favored

neither Batista nor Castro, but rather one of the other
8Ibid., 865.
9Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy.
Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1987), 39-44.
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opposition groups.10 Eisenhower was caught in a no-win
situation.

If he continued to support Batista, he would be

branded as tolerating the brutal measures imposed by
Batista.

If he followed the advice of some of his advisers

and opted for Castro, he would be open to charges of letting
down an ally.
Little by little Batista’s regime crumbled.

In

December 1958 Castro's forces launched an attack against
Santa Clara in Las Villas province in eastern Cuba.

As

Castro's forces grew to significant numbers, it became more
difficult for the Batista forces to put down the
revolutionary movement.

Government forces surrendered to

Castro in vast numbers.11 The mutiny of the military was a
stepping stone to the eventual fall of Batista.

He was

about to lose the last bastion of support within Cuba.
On 31 December 1958, the imminent fall of Batista was
discussed in the office of the Secretary of State, Christian
Herter.12 In attendance were the Secretary of State, Allen
Dulles, Director of the CIA, Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Deputy
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, William
10Eisenhower, 521.
11Ibid., 520.
12The information concerning this meeting was drawn
from notes written by Admiral Burke based on his personal
recollection. These uncatalogued notes are part of the
Admiral Arleigh Burke Papers, Naval Historical Center,
Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as
"Burke notes."
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Wieland, in charge of the Cuba desk at the State Department,
Robert Murphy, Deputy Secretary of State, and Admiral
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations-[CNO]. Rubottom
opened the meeting by stating that Batista had lost control
and was willing to leave Cuba.

Rubottom stressed that it

was essential for the United States to force Batista out of
office if he delayed any further, and he concluded that the
U.S. should take advantage of the rise of Castro by trying
to establish good relations with him.
allowing Castro to assume power.

Admiral Burke opposed

The Batista government was

ruthless and not ideal, but at least Batista maintained good
relations with the U.S.

Burke, therefore, recommended

putting a group of men in power alongside Batista.

Their

job would be to make sure that Batista continue to protect
American interests.

This group of leaders would manage the

country while ensuring that Batista still appeared to remain
in control.

Burke claimed that the U.S. was in a position

to force Batista to accept Washington's directions because
without American support he would fall from power.13
Admiral Burke was one of the earliest opponents of
Castro.

During his tour as CNO, the Office of Naval

Intelligence kept a close eye on the progress of the
movement.

There was no doubt in Burke's mind that Castro

was a communist.

Castro's ultimate objective, like that of

13Burke notes, 3-11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
other dictators, would be the never-ending quest for power.
Burke questioned Castro's intent and character:
A man like Castro is a brilliant man. [He]
disdains advice free his people. He doesn't have
much respect for anybody or anything . . .
including his own people. He was powerful and he
could make decisions
He was wise, usually, and
he made good decisions. But he was arrogant.
The danger of an arrogant man is that 99 percent
of his decisions will be correct. [When wrong]
he will be so damn wrong that he will ruin the
country.14
Castro's actions in the Sierra Maestra mountains worried
Burke.

Communists in Castro's inner circle of advisers

fueled Burke's suspicions.

In 1958 Castro's forces

kidnapped naval personnel from the naval base at Guantanamo
Bay and held them hostage in the Sierra Maestra mountains.
Burke knew where the hostages were being kept.

He was

prepared to send in Marines to rescue the hostages as soon
as he received the authorization.15 Castro's frequent
attacks against Batista strongholds near the U.S. naval base
at Guantanamo Bay concerned Burke.

In the summer of 1958

Burke, in cooperation with the Cuban government, sent in
U.S. marines to protect the water pumping stations along the
Yateras River, which provided fresh water to the Guantanamo
14Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interview by
author, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia, 23 February 1988.
1sAdmiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interviewed by
author, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia, 16 September
1988.
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naval base.16 Burke was concerned that the rise of Castro
would provide a foothold in the Caribbean to the Soviets and
threaten the security of the naval base At Guantanamo.

In

the future the Navy would have a greater stake to lose if
Cuba fell into the hands of the communists.
Few in the meeting accepted Burke's warnings, and he
was overruled by the State Department officials.

Rubottom

and Wieland argued that the Cuban people would not allow
Castro to fall into the hands of the communists.

They

explained that it was natural for a revolutionary like
Castro to include various elements of the opposition within
the movement.

By diversifying his movement, Castro created

the necessary foundation to generate popular support for his
causes.17
Dulles and Murphy supported Burke during the meeting
on New Year's Eve.
himself.

Secretary of State Herter did not commit

Those in attendance conceded to the State

Department's argument that there was no other viable choice
to replace Batista.

Burke continued to argue that it was a

major responsibility of the U.S. to have Cubans in power who
were friendly to American interests.

Burke claimed that

American interests were best served by supporting these
people.

Again, Burke was refuted because such American

16Eisenhower, 520.
17Burke notes, 13-17.
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19
actions were in violation of the OAS charter forbidding
meddling in the affairs of another country.

Burke was

adamant that Castro would follow the communist line and Cuba
would eventually become another China.

Dulles supported

Burke's claims that there was communist infiltration in
Castro's movement but removed his objections when no hard
evidence could be submitted.
in opposition to Castro.

Only Burke and Murphy remained

After a lengthy argument they

agreed with the others.18
Burke had several misgivings about the policy
established in the meeting on New Year's Eve in the office
of the Secretary of State.
of Wieland on Rubottom.

Burke questioned the influence

Burke claimed that Rubottom was too

lax in his examination of Wieland's proposals.

Rubottom

read the material and heard the briefings on the Cuban
situation and convinced himself that Castro was a non
threat.

Burke considered that people like Rubottom, other

government officials, and the American press failed to
accept the potential danger because it was not an imminent
threat to immediate American interests.

Many in the U.S.

felt that Castro was the liberator of the oppressed in Cuba
and would establish a democratic society.

Administration

officials ignored Burke's warnings that Castro was
establishing the foundation of a communist power center
18Ibid.
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while consolidating his power base.19
The following day. New Year's Day, 1 January 1959, the
issue of selecting a replacement for Batista became moot,
for on that morning the dictator fled to exile in the
Dominican Republic.
power.

Fidel Castro and his supporters seized

The New York Times hailed the rise of Castro in its

2 January 1959 editorial:
One . . . thing must be said and this is an
acknowledgement to the extraordinary young man,
Fidel Castro, who fought against such heavy odds
with such tenacity, bravery, and intelligence
since his pathetically weak band of youths landed
in Oriente Province on December 2, 1956. A great
burden now falls on his shoulders, and a task
harder in its way than the struggle for liberty
that has now ended. The American people will
wish him and all Cubans good fortune.
Castro's initial actions showed promise for a
transition to a democratic society.

Carlos Manuel Urrutia

Llea and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, two respected Cuban
businessmen, were appointed Provisional President and
Premier, respectively.

The Eisenhower Administration showed

good faith by quickly recognizing the new government.21
By the end of January the relationship between the
Castro regime and the Eisenhower Administration soured.
Castro repeatedly attacked the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air
19Ibid.
^"Cuban Dictator Falls," New York Times. 2 January
1959, 24.
21Eisenhower, 522.
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Force missions in Cuba because they had sponsored the
training and support that Batista's forces received during
the revolution.

Speaking in Caracas, Venezuela, Castro was

extremely critical of U.S. policy and its protection of
"onerous American capital" in Cuba.

In February Castro

appeared on Cuban television blasting the United States for
historically oppressing Cuba.

Premier Cardona resigned as a

result of his opposition to the direction the Castro
movement was taking.

Following Cardona's resignation Castro

appointed himself Premier and stated that it was the
responsibility of the United States to better Cuban-American
relations.

Castro stressed that the United States had to

purchase more Cuban sugar.

Although Castro expected the

United States to pump more American dollars into the Cuban
sugar industry, he also claimed that Cuba was no longer
dependent on the United States and would establish relations
with any nation it chooses, especially the Soviet Union and
China.22
It became increasingly obvious to the Eisenhower
Administration that Castro was moving further away from a
position of cooperation with the United States.

Threats of

Cuban nationalization of American-owned businesses grew
along with Castro's biting anti-American rhetoric.

In March

1959 Cuba seized control of the Cuban Telephone Company, an
^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence
Review 16, no. 2 (February 1961): 72.

u.
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affiliate of the International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation.

In April 1959 Rail Castro claimed that the

United States was an "enemy of the revolution."

Later, in

June 1959, Guevara travelled to Egypt and India for the
purpose of aligning Cuba with other neutral nations.

During

the trip Guevara continually made speeches denouncing the
United States for its historic oppression of the Cuban
people and continued imperialistic intentions as exhibited
by the American naval presence at the Guantanamo Naval
_

Base.

23

Fear grew throughout Latin America of the possible
spread of Castro's revolution. In his January visit to
Venezuela Castro asked President Romulo Betancourt to
support his efforts to "liberate" Puerto Rico from the grasp
of the United States.
Betancourt.

Castro failed to win the support of

Castro later blasted both Venezuela and Costa

Rica for failing to support his opposition to the American
presence in the Caribbean.24 Cuban-sponsored insurrection
surfaced throughout the region after Castro failed to
receive support from other Latin American leaders.
Revolutionaries sponsored by Cuba launched unsuccessful
^Ibid., 73.
24Higgins, 43.
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invasions in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.96
Washington grew concerned about Castro's obvious
leanings toward communism.

Following the' recognition of the

communist party in Cuba, Castro sent Guevara to Moscow as
Cuba's representative to the 2isc Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party.

While in Moscow Guevara credited the

communists in Cuba with ousting Batista and continuing the
fight against American interference in Cuban affairs.

In

February Castro denounced the United States and reported
that Cuba would not side with the United States in its
confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

In

that same month Castro postponed promised elections until
1961.

In a briefing at the White House on 26 March 1959,

Allen Dulles warned Eisenhower that Cuba was evolving into a
communist state under the leadership of Castro.

The

communists did not control the government, but their
influence in the military, labor unions, and police forces
grew.26
In April 1959 Castro visited the United States to
speak to the United Nations.

Eisenhower originally

considered denying Castro a visa but was advised against
that course of action.

But the President adamantly refused

^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence
Review 16,
no. 2 (February 1961): 73.
^Eisenhower, 522-23.
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to see Castro.
see him.

Instead, he directed Vice President Nixon to

The result was a three-hour conversation which

convinced Nixon that Castro was a communist.

In a briefing

given to Eisenhower following his conversation with Castro
Nixon stated, "[Castro] looked like a revolutionary, talked
like an idealistic college professor and reacted like a
communist."

Nixon concluded, "Castro is either incredibly

naive about communism or is under communist discipline."27
As a result of his conversation with Castro, Nixon was one
of the first advocates of training Cuban guerrillas in exile
towards the ultimate goal of ousting Castro.28
Castro continued his anti-American rhetoric and
consolidation of power through the use of intimidation and
executions into early 1960.

The Eisenhower Administration

grew more perturbed with the Cuban situation.

Particularly

bothersome were Castro's continual attacks towards the
United States while it continued to subsidize Cuban goods.
Following his seizure of power Castro's depleted treasury
received an advance of §15 million in subsidies from
American oil companies.

Even with United States government

support and oil company subsidies, Castro nationalized
^Richard M. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro and JFK: Reflections
on U.S. Foreign Policy," Reader's Digest. November 1964,
284.
^Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and
Realities (New York: Praeger, 1962), 62-64.
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American-owned businesses.29 The problem of coping with the
nationalization of American-owned businesses plagued the
Eisenhower Administration.
and political dilemma.

Eisenhower whs in a diplomatic

It was difficult to tolerate

American interests being trampled by Castro, but stiff
policies might push Cuba closer, if not into, the Soviet
Union's open arms.

If American actions were viewed as too

stringent by some Latin American leaders Eisenhower might
jeopardize years of good will.

In order to maintain solid

Latin American support for the United States' policies in
the region, he decided to maintain a policy of toleration
towards Castro.

In January 1960, though, in a show of

growing weariness of Cuba, Washington recalled Ambassador
Phillip Bonsai from Havana for consultations.
did not wish to break ties with Cuba.

Eisenhower

He stressed the need

to work within the framework of the OAS to isolate Cuba.

If

Castro failed to cooperate, Eisenhower favored a
multilateral blockade of Cuba coordinated by the OAS.

The

pressure of a blockade, he hoped, would turn the populace
against Castro or force him to work with the OAS.

The

intent would be to "starve" the population into getting rid
of Castro.30
^Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York:
Macmillan, 1968), 185-87.
30 .

•
Higgins,
48.
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American corporations with interests in Cuba fueled
the fire for stiffer economic measures against Castro.
After being pressured by Secretary of the Treasury Robert
Anderson, several American-owned petroleum refineries
refused to refine 300,000 barrels of Soviet crude oil.

In

response, the Cuban government directed Esso, Texaco, and
Shell to provide plans for the refining of the Soviet oil or
risk Cuban take-over.

On 29 June 1960, following the

petroleum companies' refusal to refine the Soviet oil, the
Cuban government seized the Texaco refinery and two barges
of Soviet oil were pulled into the refinery.

The Esso and

Shell refineries were seized the next day by members of the
Cuban worker's militia.31 In retaliation, Secretary of
State Herter urged the House Committee on Agriculture to
revoke the sugar quota.

On 5 July 1960 Congress approved

the measure granting the President the power to cut the
sugar quota.

Eisenhower signed the bill the next day.

The

quota called for the cutting of 700,000 tons in 1960.
Further cuts reduced the sugar quota entirely by 1961.32
Without any more stringent measures, Eisenhower's
options were limited.

The Soviet Union and other eastern-

bloc nations supplanted the cutback of American economic
31"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence
Review 16, no. 3 (March 1961): 112-13.
^Ibid., 114; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of the
Hero. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 818.
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subsidies to Cuba.

Cordial economic relations between the

Soviet Union and Cuba had been established in February 1960.
In a visit to Havana Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I.
Mikoyan signed an agreement calling for the normalization of
relations between the two countries.

In addition, the

Soviet Union agreed to a trade and credit deal and also
agreed to furnish Soviet technicians.

After the Soviet-

Cuban trade agreement was signed, Czechoslovakia established
a $60 million line of credit for the purchase of jet
aircraft, tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, and small arms.33
In May 1960 the first Soviet advisers arrived in Havana.
Further Cuban dealings with other communist nations included
the exchange of students with China.

Castro's direct

involvement with ccmmunist-bloc nations aggravated an
already sensitive American position towards Cuba.34
Castro's growing dominance proved that something more
stringent than economic measures was necessary.

It was

difficult, though, for Eisenhower to rally American support
against Castro because he posed no truly imminent threat to
American interests.

As Castro's ties to Moscow grew, it was

evident to the President that "something had to be done."35
•
“ "Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence
Review 16, no. 2 (February 1961): 80.
^"Two Years of Castro," Office of Naval Intelligence
Review 16, no. 3 (March 1961): 111-14.
^Eisenhower, 524-25.
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The random executions of Castro's opposition, the
nationalization of American-owned businesses, and finally
the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major Cuban ally
forced Washington to reassess its policies towards Cuba.

A

political and strategic threat slowly emerging ninety miles
off the southern coast of the United States.
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CHAPTER TWO
17 MARCH 1960:

THE WHEELS TURN

Clandestine operations in the Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] had a way of running on their own during the
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations with little outside
interference.

The CIA was constantly involved in non-stop,

secret wars against perceived communist forces.

Since 1948

the CIA had kept leftist forces throughout the world offbalance on more than one occasion.

The CIA's operations in

Greece in 1948, the Philippines in 1952-1953, Iran in 1953,
and Guatemala in 1954 were successful and kept American
involvement low keyed.

The agency had experience and the

requisite knowledge to conduct successful operations.

The

Cuban situation provided the CIA with a sizable challenge.1
The "5412 Committee" was established as an adjunct to
the National Security Council to discuss CIA covert
operations and other intelligence matters which affected
national security.

The committee consisted of the Deputy

Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
the Director of the CIA, and the National Security Adviser.
1Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, "The Confessions of Allen
Dulles, New Evidence on the Bay of Pigs," Diplomatic History
8, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 371-72.
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Its mission was to review, discuss, and approve the CIA's
covert plans.

On 17 March 1960, the "5412 Committee" met

with the President, members of the White-House Staff, State
Department, and Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] in the White
House.

In attendance were Vice President Nixon, Secretary

of State Herter, Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston
Merchant, Roy Rubottom, John Irwin, Admiral Burke, Deputy
Director of the CIA Richard Bissell, Secretary of the
Treasury Anderson, and General Andrew Goodpaster.2 The
discussions concerned the various measures available to the
President to handle the Cuban situation.

The general

consensus of the meeting was that the situation had gotten
out of hand.

Eisenhower felt particularly perturbed that a

communist regime so close to the United States was "thumbing
its nose" at the United States.3 Castro had become an
oppressive dictator under the influence of the Soviet Union
and China.

There was no chance of democracy emerging in

Cuba so long as Castro remained in power.

Individual

freedoms needed to be restored and Sino-Soviet influence
^cGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum of Meeting with the
President, 17 March 1960," Papers of the Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs, Meetings with the President,
Special Assistant Series, Presidential Subseries, 1960 file,
vol. 2 (2), box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene,
Kansas.
3Stephen Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the
Espionage Establishment (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981),
303.
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eliminated.

A realistic agrarian reform program needed to

be established.4 With Castro in power oppression would
continue, but most important, the United- States was faced
with a strategic and political dilemma as Soviet influence
in the region grew.
At the conclusion of the meeting Eisenhower directed
Dulles and the CIA to develop a plan to replace the Castro
regime with one more "devoted to the true interests of the
Cuban people" and more acceptable to the interests of the
United States.

No overt American involvement was allowed.

Eisenhower authorized support and direction for rebels
inside and outside Cuba.

The President approved four

courses of action:
1.

Creation of an exile group opposed to Castro,

2.

Development of a means to spread propaganda

throughout Cuba,
3.

Creation of a covert intelligence network inside

4.

Development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba.

Cuba,

The fourth course of action consisted of two phases.

The

first phase consisted of recruiting and training leaders of
the movement.

These leaders would be trained as

paramilitary instructors.

The second phase consisted of the

4Dwight D. Eisenhower, Personal Papers, Post
Presidential Series, Palm Desert, California, Cuba file, box
10, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
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rebel paramilitary leaders training other Cuban exiles for
eventual insertion into Cuba to conduct guerrilla operations
against the Castro regime.5
Eisenhower wanted an operation similar to the one
conducted in Guatemala in 1954.

On 18 June 1954 two hundred

revolutionaries sponsored by the CIA crossed the Honduran
border into Guatemala.

These troops received air cover from

three P-47 fighter planes and a pair of Cessnas.

During the

"invasion" a radio barrage of propaganda was broadcast from
Swan Island in the Caribbean.

The CIA hoped that there

would be a general uprising against the Arbenz regime during
the invasion.

The light bombing throughout Guatemala,

coupled with jamming of local radio stations and misleading
information broadcast from Swan Island, finally provoked a
revolt within the Guatemalan military against the
government.

Arbenz was deposed and Castillo Armas,

supported by the CIA, was installed in power.6 The planner
of the Guatemalan operation, Richard Bissell, felt that the
probability of success in Cuba was dependent on Castro
falling to the same kind of pressure put on Arbenz.

Bissell

sGeneral Maxwell Taylor, "Taylor Committee Report and
Memorandum for the Record of Paramilitary Study Group
Meetings, Part III," Annex 1, John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston, Massachusetts, p. 1. Hereafter cited as "Taylor
Reports.11
6Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy.
Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1987), 30-34.
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based his strategy on "a protracted period of psychological
and political warfare."

Bissell didn't think that Castro

would resist:
The chance of true success— that is the chance of
toppling Castro— was predicated on the assumption
that, faced with that kind of pressure, he would
suffer the same loss of nerve [as Arbenz].7
Eisenhower approved the development of a plan to
topple Castro in March 1960.

The plan called for the

training of twenty guerrilla leaders.

Training sites were

established at the U.S. Army Jungle Warfare School at Fort
Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.

The other training

location was at Retalheu, Guatemala.

The guerrilla leaders

were to receive training in tactics, infiltration, methods
of strengthening and "knitting up" the suppose active
guerrilla resistance in Cuba.

After initial training this

group were to train seventy-five other exiles with an
ultimate objective of three hundred additional recruits.
The final aspects of training were to prepare the guerrillas
for eventual infiltration into Cuba and building a network
of guerrilla resistance with logistical support from the
United States.8
7Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The
Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: Univ. of Texas
Press, 1982), 194-95.
Richard Bissell,
Oral History Research
University, New York,
the Secrets: Richard
A. Knopf, 1979), 112.

Interview by Ed Edwin, 5 June 1967,
Office, Butler Library, Columbia
29; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept
Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred
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On 18 August 1960 Bissell briefed the President on the
status of the operation.

A communications site consisting

of a 50 kilowatt radio station was established on Swan
Island in the central Caribbean.
18 May 1960.

It began broadcasting on

Bissell advised Eisenhower that training was

progressing but additional funds and Department of Defense
[DoD] support was needed.

Eisenhower approved a budget

increase of $13 million as well as the use of DoD personnel
and equipment for training in Guatemala.

Eisenhower

stressed that no U.S. troops would be used in a combat
status.9
The JCS were informed of the plan well after the
wheels started turning.

The JCS and Navy were intentionally

left out of the planning and development phases in order to
protect the security of the operation.

The CIA went ahead

with the training in Central America, arranged the purchase
of antiquated World War II amphibious landing craft and
ships (LCIs and LSDs), and recruited additional exiles to
conduct the mission.

Even though DoD personnel and

equipment were brought into operation as early as August
1960, the JCS never officially received briefings on the
operation until October.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, USA,

Chairman of the JCS, was briefed on the plan only after the
President asked Dulles to give a briefing on the status of
9Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Cuban operation during a White House meeting.

Admiral

Burke and Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Jr., Commander in
Chief, Atlantic, [CINCLANT], gained information of the
operation through Naval Intelligence sources in Guatemala
and Nicaragua.

In its initial phases neither the JCS nor

the Navy received a detailed briefing of the operation.
They were not allowed to participate in the planning or
logistical coordination of the plan.
Security was paramount.

It was a CIA matter.

The JCS could not discuss the

operation with anyone, not even their immediate staffs.10
As the operation grew, the security issue would become a
greater burden for the Navy in its attempts to prepare for
any contingencies that might require the use of American
naval forces to assist in the conduct of the mission.
By late October 1960 problems continued to grow in the
operation and the CIA was forced to change plans.

Scheduled

commitments were not met because the CIA encountered
difficulty creating a unified opposition to Castro.
Island sporadically broadcast propaganda.

Swan

To compound

matters the underground in Cuba was overrated and
unorganized.

Security was so lax that it was fairly easy

for Castro to round up suspected guerrillas.

Castro

isolated remaining guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains and
10Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and
His Joint Chiefs of Staff" (Ph.D. diss., University of South
Carolina, 1981), 180-86.
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literally starved them out.

On 31 October the CIA

recommended that the scope of the operation be changed
because of the growing problems.

In a cable from CIA

Headquarters in Washington to the Senior Project
Representative in Retalheu the CIA alerted its agents that
changes in the operation were forthcoming.

In the change

proposed to the White House the CIA recommended that the
operation shift from guerrilla infiltrations to a
conventional amphibious landing and airborne assault.
Consequently the emphasis in training shifted from guerrilla
warfare and infiltration tactics to conventional assault
consisting of squad, platoon, and company regimented
training.

The cable to Retalheu concluded that a

possibility existed that the revolutionary forces would
receive U.S. Army special forces training and support.11 On
4 November Eisenhower authorized changing the format of the
operation to a conventional assault.

The size of the

revolutionary force grew from the original 20 guerrilla
leaders to approximately 600 to 750 exiles in training.

The

operation now included a preliminary air strike launched
from Nicaragua to wipe out Castro's air force and other
military targets.

After the amphibious landing, air strikes

and logistical flights to the beachhead would continue.

The

invading force would have to secure the beachhead, maintain
11Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 4.
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a visible presence, and then draw a sizable number of
dissidents from the military and civilian populace for
support of the landing force.

These defections would

trigger a popular uprising against the Castro regime.12
Following the uprising a provisional government made up of
Cuban exiles recruited by the CIA would be established on
the beachhead.
A major decision to shift the nature of the operation
from guerrilla infiltrations to full scale amphibious
landings should have been reviewed and if necessary modified
by the nation's military chiefs.

All review and

modifications continued to be made by the CIA alone with no
outside assistance.

In order to ease training and

coordination with the military, the JCS temporarily assigned
Marine Corps Colonels Jack Hawkins and Stanley Beerli to
coordinate the military training of the ground and air
forces.

If the CIA had interpreted this as an indication of

a joint CIA-JCS cooperation, it was in error.13 The Joint
Chiefs' action was taken to assist another government agency
conduct an operation, not to take part in it.
The small-scale guerrilla assault force escalated by
December 1960 into a full-scale amphibious landing force
consisting of the Cuban Expeditionary Force [CEF]. The
12Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 3-5.
13John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 360.
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training of the expeditionary force spread throughout the
United States, Central America, and the Caribbean.
forces received training at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

The tank
The

guerrilla forces were trained at Belle Chaise, Louisiana,
and the Panama Canal Zone.

Key West, Florida, was the

logistical center for the force.

The maritime forces were

trained at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico.

Twelve American

pilots were recruited from the Alabama, Arkansas, and
Virginia Air National Guard.

These pilots participated in

formation flying and gunnery exercises with Cuban exile
pilots at Retalheu.

The staging area for the operation was

at Puerto Cabezas on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua.14
In Washington skepticism grew as a result of the shift
to a full-scale amphibious assault.

General Robert E.

Cushman, Jr., Vice President Nixon's executive assistant for
national security affairs, called the operation pretty
"hairy."

He mentioned that if the invasion failed, the U.S.

should be ready to put Marines on the beach.

Realistically,

Cushman admitted that the invasion was so big that it was
going to be nearly impossible to avoid linking the United
States to the operation.15 Neither Secretary of Defense
Thomas Gates nor Undersecretary of State James Douglas felt
14Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red:
The Storv of the Secret War against Castro (New York:
Harper & Row, 1981), 65-66.
15Higgins, 63-64.
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comfortable with the operation.

Gates called the

expeditionary forces wholly inadequate.

Douglas wanted to

disassociate the DoD from the final approval of the
operation.16
In November 1961 John F. Kennedy was elected
President.

Director of the CIA Allen Dulles briefed the new

President on the Cuban situation on 17 and 29 November.
Kennedy was impressed with the operation and told Dulles to
carry on.

There was little advice or direction given by

either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration following
Dulles' briefings.

In the weeks following the election the

government "floated in a void."

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,

a member of Kennedy's inner circle of advisers, claimed that
decisions were not made because neither camp wanted to make
them.

As a result, existing plans carried on as planned.

Kennedy approved of the operation in general but warned
planners to be ready for a review and discussion following
the inauguration.17 Failure of either administration to act
allowed the operation to gather greater momentum.

More and

more money and time were spent on the training of the
expeditionary force.

York:

16Peter Wyden, Bay of Pias: The Untold Storv (New
Simon and Schuster, 1979), 72.

York:

17Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Davs (New
Greenwich House, 1965), 233-34.
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The CIA was in a difficult position.

Little, if any,

direction came from the White House before the inauguration,
but pressure from outside the United States began to grow.
President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes of Guatemala, who earlier
had granted the CIA permission to use a military base for
training outside Retalheu, faced growing opposition to the
training of the Cuban exiles.

In December 1960 he told the

CIA that the time was coming when the force would have to
move out of Guatemala.

The CIA seriously considered

airlifting the expeditionary force to a small island in the
Pacific.

The CIA was becoming desperate about the security

of the operation.

The State Department objected to moving

the entire force to the United States.

By the turn of the

new year the size of the force reached between 800 and 900
revolutionary exiles.18 That number eventually grew to over
1400 soldiers.

The exile group consisted of a mix of

farmers, fisherman, lawyers, doctors, and bankers.

The

group was formed into a brigade of soldiers ready for battle
in little less than a year.13 On 3 January 1961 Eisenhower
warned Kennedy that if the operation had any chance of
success the incoming administration would have to act
quickly.

Castro's militia was growing in strength daily.

Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann informed Kennedy
18Bissell, 31-32.
19Mario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Reader's Digest.
September 1964, 258-59.
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that of the two hundred thousand members of Castro's
militia, approximately 10 per cent were ready to fight for
Castro and the number was increasing.

Mann also stressed

his opinion that U.S. military support was necessary for the
operation to succeed.20 Kennedy listened to the briefs and
deferred any decision until after the inauguration.
Another change in the plans took place in January
1961.

The scope of the operation shifted from an amphibious

landing and airborne assault to an operation consisting of a
guerrilla strikes inside Cuba coinciding with the landings
and air strikes.
B-26 bombers.

The Cuban expeditionary air force included

The CIA chose B-26s in order to avoid the

American government being associated with the operation.
The B-26s were common warplanes in that region.
The increase in the magnitude of the operation was due
to the changing environment in Cuba.

In late November

Castro partially mobilized the civilian militia in addition
to his regular army forces in preparation for the imminent
invasion.

CIA-sponsored air drops to rebels inside Cuba

became more and more ineffective as Castro continued to
round up suspected guerrillas.

The growing number of arms

supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union and Eastern-Bloc
nations gave Castro a formidable force.21 The numbers of
^Higgins, 72.
21Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum l, p. 3.
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exiles participating in the operation had to increase to
ensure any probability of success.

Neutralization of

Castro's air force, tanks, and artillery emplacements was
essential.
While the training of the brigade continued, relations
between the United States and Cuba worsened.

On 2 January

1961 Castro gave the American Embassy in Havana forty-eight
hours to reduce the size of its diplomatic mission to a
level on a par with the Cuban mission in Washington.

In a

meeting at the White House on 3 January, Eisenhower
discussed breaking relations with Cuba.

The President was

tired of America "being kicked around" and warned that if
any Americans in Cuba were hurt, he would not hesitate to
send in the Marines.

During the meeting Dulles advised

Eisenhower that the paramilitary force training in Guatemala
was the best military force in Central America and the time
was right for launching the invasion.

Support for Castro

among Cuba's white collar workers eroded.

Based on CIA's

intelligence estimates, Castro's overall popularity rating
in Cuba dropped from a 95 percent support level following
his seizure of power to 25 to 33 percent.22 After the U.S.
broke relations with Cuba on 4 January 1961, Eisenhower
directed Herter to brief in-coming Secretary of State Dean
^cGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum of the Meeting with the
President, 3 January 1961," Box 35, Country Series, Cuba,
General, vol. I, 1/61-4/61, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston,
Massachusetts.
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Rusk and see if Kennedy wanted to join in a united
resolution concerning the Cuban situation.

Rusk responded

that in the absence of complete information on the entire
situation, the Kennedy Administration elected to refrain
from entering into a joint resolution.23 In the meantime
Eisenhower's advisers recommended intervention against
Castro.

Time was on the side of Castro.

Admiral Burke and

the JCS were ardent proponents of the use of military force
against Cuba.

The Joint Chiefs favored the immediate

overthrow of Castro but did not support the original CIA
plan.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (JCSM) 44-61, "U.S.

Plan of Action in Cuba," discussed the various options
available to overthrow Castro.

The plan recommended that

the military devise and implement a plan of attack based on
the use of Cuban revolutionaries with covert U.S. military
support.

Although similar to the original CIA concept, JCSM

44-61 provided alternatives in ascending order of magnitude
and involvement to accomplish the mission:
1.

Pressure— the U.S. pressures Cuba with economic

sanctions, including embargoes, breaks diplomatic relations,
encourages the use of the Organization of American States
[OAS] to isolate Cuba, continue propaganda efforts, and
continue naval and aerial surveillance.

The Navy would

provide the show of force during surveillance and naval
^James Reston, "Kennedy Avoids Role in Decision," New
York Times. 4 January 1961, 1.
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maneuvers off the coast of Cuba.
2.

Internal Uprising— the U.S. would foster internal

dissent and civil unrest through propaganda broadcasts, air
drops of leaflets, and press releases.

The military would

provide whatever logistical support was necessary to assist
the operation.
3.

Volunteer Invasion Force with Covert American

support— the U.S. would train and support a group of exiles
in preparation for an invasion of Cuba.

Again, the military

would provide the logistical support.
4.

Guerrilla Support with Covert Support— the U.S.

would train guerrillas for insertion into Cuba to start
guerrilla activities with covert U.S. military support.
5.

Volunteer Invasion Force with Overt Action— the

U.S. would train guerrilla forces to be inserted in Cuba to
start guerrilla activities with direct U.S. military
participation.

In this course of action the Navy would

provide a naval blockade.
6.

Overt U.S. Action Supported by Latin American

Volunteers— the U.S. military would invade with assistance
from revolutionary volunteers.

The invasion would be

supported by a naval blockade.
7.

Unilateral Overt U.S. Action— the U.S. military

would invade with no assistance from outside forces.

A

naval blockade would coincide with the invasion.
The main emphasis of JCSM 44-61 was to propose the ascending
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degrees of military involvement available depending on the
success or failure of the initial actions.

In conclusion,

the JCS recommended the development of an interdepartmental
group to review the various options available to the
Administration.24 Eisenhower deferred a decision on the
invasion to the incoming administration.
Kennedy was inaugurated on 20 January 1961.

During

his campaign he had promised a more successful policy
towards Cuba.

He harshly criticized the Republican Party

for allowing Cuba to go communist.

Kennedy promised not to

remain passive towards Castro and was committed to helping
the Cuban opposition eliminate Castro.

Kennedy was

impressed by the dedication of the exiles and the
preparations already underway for invading Cuba.

The CIA's

plan was in accord with his own personal thinking.25
Kennedy felt that the shift in Cuba towards communism was
like "seeing a treasured childhood retreat decay into a
tawdry slumdom overrun by rowdy toughs."26
On 28 January 1961 Kennedy held his first cabinet
meeting to discuss the CIA's plan.

During the meeting

Dulles informed Kennedy that Cuba was totally dominated by
24Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 7, pp. 6-7.
^Philip Bonsai, Cuba. Castro, and the United States
(Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 181-82.
^David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis. 1962
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979), 32.
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the communists and Castro was increasing the country's
military power and influence in the region.

Dulles claimed

that while Castro was increasing his foundation of power,
popular discontent was flourishing.

A growing opposition

movement to Castro was developing inside Cuba.

Several

covert operations were already in motion, such as propaganda
broadcasts from Swan Island, sabotage of the Cuban sugar
industry, and CIA-sponsored guerrilla attacks against
Castro's strongholds.

New Secretary of Defense McNamara

countered Dulles' optimistic view of the situation by
warning the President that no plan currently in place for
the removal of Castro would succeed.
Rusk echoed McNamara's sentiments.

Secretary of State
Rusk warned the

President of the possible implications of covert action
conducted without the support of the OAS.

Kennedy

authorized continuation of the plan and accentuation of
propaganda efforts, political isolation of Castro, and
sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry.

He also directed the

CIA and the JCS to review the proposals in their respective
fields for the use of Cuban exile forces to overthrow
Castro.27
In response to the President's directives of 28
January the JCS submitted Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
[JCSM] 57-61, "The Military Evaluation of the CIA
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 8.
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Paramilitary Plan, Cuba."

The Joint Chiefs provided a

thorough and concise evaluation of the military portion of
the CIA's plan to overthrow Castro by an amphibious landing
on the southern coast of Cuba near the town of Trinidad.
The plan that was reviewed by the JCS called for the
operation to be conducted outside the town of Trinidad, an
area with the ingredients necessary for a successful
amphibious landing.

The Amphibious Objective Area [AOA] was

a semi-circle with a perimeter approximately eleven miles
from Trinidad.

A city was within the beachhead, as were an

airfield, roads, a river, and an open bay.

The perimeter

was in low hill masses surrounded by large elevated hills,
approximately seven hundred feet high.

The overlooking

hills provided adequate means for the defense of the
beachhead.

The area between the perimeter and the beachhead

consisted of flat, heavily wooded land.

Two good roads

entered the AOA from the east and west with a railroad
entering from the northeast.

The area was suitable for the

use of tanks and heavy mobile equipment.
The beachhead consisted of three small beaches, two at
the mouth of the river and one on the west side of the bay.
The sizes of the beaches varied from sixty to one hundred
yards long with navigable waters.

There were sufficient

transit areas for small vehicles on the beaches.

The air

drop zone on the beach was approximately two thousand yards
long on open, flat terrain.

A key aspect of the plan was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48
that the beachhead was remote.
area were limited.

The access roads into the

The routes limited incoming traffic.

The rugged terrain facilitated the movement of guerrillas
into the hills if the mission failed.
The invading force expected to encounter light
resistance once the landing began.
Cuba had a local militia unit.

The size of the unit varied

according to the size of the town.
call from the police station.
issue of weapons.

Each village and town in

The units assembled on

The police controlled the

The JCS suspected that the police

controlled access to the weapons because Castro did not
trust the militia to fight the guerrillas without turning on
the government forces.28
According to the plan, on the day before the invasion
(D -1), an air strike would be conducted against Cuban
aircraft on the ground, naval patrol vessels, key
communications facilities, radar sites, microwave
facilities, tank and artillery positions at Managua, the
highway and railroad bridges outside the beachhead, as well
as other bridges.

At approximately 2000 on D -1 a

diversionary landing would be staged on the northwest coast
of Cuba by two Underwater Demolition Teams [UDTs]. If the
initial air strike failed, late on the night of D -1
paratroops would be dropped into the beachhead to blow up
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 9, pp. 8-12.
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the three key bridges in the AOA.29
According to the plan, on the day of the invasion
(D-Day) a U.S. Navy amphibious landing ship (LSD), with a
well deck to carry landing craft (LCUs and LCVPs), would
off-load the boats and personnel.

Prior to dawn on D-Day

the B-26s would conduct a second air strike against the
beach, air strip, and any remaining targets left from the
previous air strike.

At dawn the task force would land by

boat and parachute drops from air planes on the east and
west beach.

The beachhead would be secured by closing the

access roads on the perimeter.

If all went according to

schedule, the AOA would be secured by nightfall.

If the

landings were successful, defections would be expected from
the Cuban military and civilian populace.

If the operation

failed, the task force would have the capability of
converting to guerrilla warfare tactics and heading for the
jungles to join up with local guerrilla groups and continue
operations from bases in the Escambray Mountains.30
It was imperative for the initial air strike to knock
out the Cuban Air Force if the operation was going to
succeed.

Fourteen of the seventeen B-26s would be used for

this purpose.

The planes would be piloted by six American

volunteer pilots and twelve Cuban exiles.

The Cubans were

^Ibid., 20.
“ ibid., 20-21.
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better at dive and skip bombing and at strafing than were
the U.S. pilots.

To ensure that mission objectives were

met, American pilots would be used in each strike against
Castro's air force.

Each aircraft would be armed with two

700 lb. napalm bombs, sixteen 220 lb. fragmentary bombs,
plus eight .50 caliber machine guns with 2400 rounds of
ammunition.

All the flights would originate at Puerto

Cabezas, Nicaragua, until the airstrip in the AOA was
secured.
In its review of the plan, the JCS pointed out that a
problem existed with the limited on-station time of the
aircraft.

The flight to Cuba from Puerto Cabezas was over

two hours each way.

If the aircraft carried napalm they

could stay in the area only twenty minutes with one hour of
fuel in reserve.

Those aircraft not carrying napalm could

stay in the area for approximately two hours with one hour
of fuel in reserve.

The limited on-station time meant that

the initial air strikes had to be accurate and that there
was little chance of repeat strikes if there were any enemy
air opposition.31 The lack of on-station time lessened the
probability of maintaining air superiority, and that would
possibly create the need for American military assistance.
The Cuban Air Force, though limited, could provide
formidable opposition if not eliminated or neutralized.

The

31Ibid., 22-23.
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Cuban air inventory included fourteen Sea Furies, three F47s, one F-51, thirteen B-26s, six TBM-38S, fifteen
transport type aircraft, and twenty-two helicopters.32 One
fatal omission in the evaluation of the plan was the lack of
information on Castro's T-33 trainer jet aircraft.

This

flaw would become apparent as the invasion progressed.
The evaluation by the JCS brought to light several
problems that the expeditionary forces could expect during
the invasion.

Even though the air strike and parachute

drops were intended to destroy the bridges in the beachhead,
the brigade had no bridging or engineering capability to
reconstruct the bridges and roads once the AOA was secured.
The failure to include these units would ensure the landing
force a secure beachhead with no possible escape except to
the sea.

The load-out of the brigade's ships included no

flood-light trailers for night time off-loads on the beach.
The manning of the force did not provide adequately trained
or sufficiently numbered shore party personnel to handle
heavy off-loading on the beach.

The off-loading of the

invading forces' ships was to be conducted by contract
labor, not members of the brigade.
problem after the shooting started.

This could pose a
The CIA did not take

into account the difficulty of off-loading the ships into
the LCUs.

It was impractical and nearly impossible to load

“ ibid., 7.
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trucks and heavy gear off ships to LCUs at sea.

The JCS

also found fault in the method of fuel replenishment for the
tanks, trucks, and boats.

The three thousand gallon

refuelers were to be used for aviation fuel (AVGAS) at the
air strip.

Fuel for the boats, tanks, and trucks (MOGAS)

used wobble pumps.

Hand-pumping gasoline was time-consuming

and dangerous in the dark.

Night time refueling would

require a lighting system, flood-light trucks and at least
one crane.

The JCS also concluded that the plan did not

consider the problem of distributing supplies on the beach.
The intent to have each platoon drawing supplies as it
needed was impractical and encouraged pilfering.

The plan

also failed to consider repair and maintenance facilities or
tank retrievers for broken-down tanks and trucks.

The most

important fault was the lack of provisions made for the
evacuation of personnel and equipment.33
Although the flaws were numerous, the JCS did find
some positive aspects to the plan.

Based on CIA

intelligence estimates the Joint Chiefs concluded that the
landing would probably be unopposed.

There would be little

air opposition with plenty of friendly air support available
if the Cuban Air Force was eliminated.
ideal for the defense of the AOA.

The terrain was

Because of its proximity

to the mountains and the anticipated network of guerrillas,
“ ibid., 26-27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
the invading force could expect local assistance during the
invasion.

The JCS felt that the high motivation and morale

of the brigade would overcome any obstacles or difficulties
encountered during the operation.34
In conclusion, the JCS felt that the plan had a "fair
chance" of success.

It was not an approval of the plan.

To

them success of the operation would be dependent on several
factors.

The operation would be dependent on local Cuban

support which required constant observation of the internal
situation in Cuba from Washington.

Careful consideration

had to be given to the airlifting of the brigade from
Retalheu to the embarkation point at Puerto Cabezas.

The

movement might compromise the security of the operation.

In

view of the complexity of the loading and marshalling phases
of the operation, the JCS recommended that the plan would
need to be continually reviewed to ensure proper
interdepartment coordination and command and control and to
ensure that security would not be jeopardized.
would be essential.

Surprise

The JCS felt that if CIA intelligence

estimates of the Cuban air capability were sound and
surprise were attained, the brigade would be large enough to
make the plan succeed.

The airborne assault should not be

opposed, so it had a strong possibility of succeeding.

The

amphibious assault should be successful against marginal
^Ibid., 37.
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opposition, but logistical support was lacking.

If the

invading force ran into considerable opposition, the
logistical support would then be totally inadequate.

The

scheme to secure the beachhead was sound but additional
planning would be required for the control and utilization
of indigenous facilities and personnel in a combat and
support role.

With no interference from expeditionary

aircraft, assault troops, or guerrillas,

Castro's forces

could move substantial forces to the beachhead by D +2.

It

would take at least two days for the CEF to plan and launch
a response to a Cuban counterattack.

Since the Cuban army

lacked experience in coordinated offensive actions, the
invasion force should be able to successfully resist
Castro's initial attacks.

Even without local volunteers, a

popular uprising, or the introduction of substantial followon forces, the JCS believed that the brigade had the
capability to capture the beach.35
The Joint Chiefs' overall impression was that the
operation would not require overt American military
intervention.

The report gave a favorable assessment

tempered by the identification of deficiencies that needed
to be addressed before the invasion began.

The objectives

were dependent on the degree of popular support and success
of the political and psychological part of the plan rather
“ibid., 2.
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than on purely military factors.

The JCS recommended that a

team of Army, Navy, and Air Force observers be sent to
Central America to assess the training and battle readiness
of the forces.36 The JCS evaluation should have been viewed
as a report that created more questions than answers.

It

should not have been viewed by some in the Kennedy
Administration as a blanket military approval of the
Trinidad Plan.

The weakness in the JCS memorandum was that

there was no clear signal sent to administration officials
concerning the military's overall support or lack of support
for the plan.
Even though the JCS gave a lukewarm endorsement to the
Trinidad Plan, there was great concern about the
effectiveness of a military plan drawn by civilians, run by
civilians, and with little, if any, military support.

Three

JCS representatives went to Guatemala to evaluate the status
of the training of the CEF.

Their evaluation, JCSM 146-61,

indicated an overall satisfaction with the training.

The

representatives stressed that in order to attain complete
surprise, the brigade should be airlifted to the landing
site.

Airlifting the troops to Cuba instead of conducting

an amphibious landing would serve two purposes.

First, the

entire force could be landed within one day of departure.
Second, an air drop of paratroops had a greater probability
“ ibid., 3, 38.

L.
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of catching the Cubans off-guard.

The JCS observers noted a

problem that would affect the surprise and security of the
operation.

The mayor of Retalheu was a communist.

wave radio transmitter operated in the city.

A short

The Communist

Party dropped propaganda leaflets in Guatemala City
describing the entire operation while the brigade trained in
Retalheu.

With a town dominated by communists one mile away

from the training site, a railroad on one side of the camp,
and a highway on the other, the air movement of the troops
from Retalheu to Puerto Cabezas would almost certainly be
noticed.

The only thing Castro would not have known was

when and where the forces were going to land.37
Based on their observations of the security conditions
at both Retalheu and Puerto Cabezas, the JCS representatives
concluded that the odds against achieving surprise during
the invasion were as high as five to one.

If surprise was

not achieved, the group concluded that the air missions
would fail.38 Even if surprise were accomplished, the
chances of keeping American involvement out of sight would
be minimal.
The CIA was operating under strict guidelines that
there be no American military involvement, and Americansponsored activities needed to be minimized. The directives
37Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 10, pp.

8-12, 18.

M Ibid, 8.

L.
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were extended to include no American support for the air
strikes launched on D-Day.39 Kennedy faced a dilemma.

Too

little U.S. support for the operation would bring failure.
Too much military involvement would show U.S. complicity in
the operation.

Yet, Kennedy wanted the operation to succeed

with no U.S. involvement.

JCS planners had a difficult time

working under these guidelines.

It would be difficult to

deny American involvemert in an operation that large.

The

forces that the CIA built were as sizable as many armies in
that region of the world.

It was an army that lacked

experienced military guidance and direction for such a
complex operation.
Brigade 2506, the Cuban Expeditionary Force, had grown
to 1442 Cuban exiles by January 1961.

The task force

consisted of 1004 personnel, organized as one infantry
battalion of four rifle companies.
consisted of paratroopers.

One rifle company

The battalion was armed with

mortars, .77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon
consisting of five M41 tanks.

Other arms included pistols,

M-l rifles, grenade launchers, submachine guns, .57 mm
recoilless rifles, flame throwers, and rocket launchers.
was a formidable arsenal.

It

The brigade's air force consisted

of seventeen B-26s, ten C-54s, and five C-46s, supported by
one hundred ground personnel and eighteen pilots.

The vast

^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum I, pp. 7-8.
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size of the brigade narrowed the CIA's options on the means
of transporting the force to Cuba.

Transporting a force

this large by air would have been difficult.

The only

feasible option was to transport the brigade by ships.

The

brigade's maritime force consisted of seven World
War II amphibious ships.

CINCLANT provided a Navy dock

landing ship (LSD) to transport the brigade's four utility
craft (LCUs) and three personnel carriers (LCVPs). The
brigade's landing ships and craft were purchased by the CIA
early in the operation from American commercial shipping
lines.40
As the training continued, uncertainty and doubt grew
in the Kennedy Administration.

During a briefing on 17

February 1961 Secretary of State Rusk proposed that the
operation be delayed so that the State Department could
gather support from members of the OAS.

Kennedy still

wanted to resolve the Cuban problem through diplomatic
channels.

He was reluctant to commit the United States to a

military operation when a political solution was still
attainable.

The guerrilla infiltration idea still appealed

to Kennedy but he wanted to give the diplomats a chance
solve the problem.41 The plan to land an amphibious force
and hold the beachhead long enough to establish a
40

Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 9, pp. 7-16.

41Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 16, p. 1.
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provisional government had its positive merits, but the
administration did not want to be forced into a position of
"political bankruptcy." Kennedy questioned how such a large
operation could be stopped after all the time and training
had been put into it.

If Kennedy called it off, he would

have a disposal problem consisting of the fifteen hundred
members of the brigade.

Latin American leaders were

unwilling to take the brigade.

If the brigade returned to

the U.S., Kennedy might be accused of not supporting
fighters of communism in the region.

Kennedy was concerned

about the political ramifications at home if he cancelled
the mission.

The Republicans, attacked by Kennedy during

the election for being soft of communism, would have a
political field day with his perceived lack of commitment
toward fighting the communists.

If the brigade were

disbanded, it might encourage the further spread of Castro's
revolution throughout the region.
become a necessity.

The contingency had

The CIA created the brigade and was

forced into a position of having to use it.
uncertain of what action to take.

Kennedy was

Kennedy listened to his

advisers' arguments and agreed with Dulles that maybe the
best place for the Cuban exiles was in Cuba.42
On 11 March 1961 Kennedy met with the National
Security Council in the White House to receive a status
^Schlesinger, 242.

k.
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report on the operation.

Bissell submitted a summary of the

CIA plan, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba."

The summary

included an overview of the operation and a report on the
status of the training of the brigade.

Bissell stated that

the Trinidad Plan had a greater chance to succeed if a
diversionary landing preceded the actual invasion.

Once the

beachhead was secured, the CIA would transport the
provisional government to the site.

The exile government

would assume power and the United States would recognize it.
Bissell claimed that the strength of the force would
withstand Castro's initial counterattack and allow the
beachhead to remain secure.
of the operation.

Kennedy grew wary of the size

He directed the CIA to establish a less

conspicuous plan, preferably a night landing, not like a
World War II amphibious landing.

On 13 March Bissell

returned and presented three alternatives for landing sites:
1.

The Preston area on the northern coast of Oriente

Province.
2.

The south coast of Las Villas Province between

Trinidad and Cienfuegos.
3.

The eastern Zapata region near Cochinos Bay, the

Bay of Pigs.
Following discussions of each site, Kennedy directed the JCS
to review each plan and make recommendations.43
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 9-11.

*" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In "An Evaluation of the Military Aspects of
Alternative Concepts, CIA Paramilitary Plan, Cuba," JCSM
166-61, the JCS reviewed the three proposed alternatives to
the Trinidad Plan.

The first alternative called for a

diversionary landing on the night of D -1 followed by a
night-time landing in the Preston area of Oriente Province
on D-Day.

The landings would be conducted without airborne

landings or air strikes.

Control of the beachhead would be

accomplished by seizing four strong points surrounding the
area.

Local guerrillas would be contacted and an air strip

cleared.

The advantage of this alternative was that a night

landing afforded a higher probability of surprise.

The

surrounding mountains provided ample cover for the invading
force.

The landing area was near the main seat of

government and the Cubans in the area were opposed to
Castro's rule.

It also provided the best beachhead of the

three alternatives.

The major disadvantage was that B-26s

could not land on the air strip, and without air cover the
Cuban Air Force would destroy the landing force.

Another

disadvantage was the inexperience of the task force in
conducting amphibious operations at night.

A successful

operation in this region was doubtful.
The second alternative called for an amphibious
landing on the south coast of Las Villas Province.

That

operation consisted of night paratroop drops prior to the
landing on D-Day to seize key points and the local pier.
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Following the seizure of the pier, ships would dock and off
load.

Units of the task force would move inland and seize

an air field and other strategic points, and establish
communications with the airborne company.

The objective

area consisted of rolling hills backed by swamps.

The area

would provide ideal protection and concealment for the
brigade.

The advantage was that the beachhead was so

isolated that it would be easy to secure.

The Joint Chiefs

concluded, however, that the disadvantages of this option
outweighed the advantages.

Surprise might not be achieved

due to the presence of a local company of Cuban regulars.
The air strip had limited capabilities and was too far from
the seat of government.

The only escape was by sea.

mountains were over ten miles away.

The

It would be difficult

to support logistically because of its isolated location.
Like the first alternative, a landing in Las Villas Province
had little chance of success.
The third alternative was landing in the eastern
Zapata region in the Bahia de Cochinos, or Bay of Pigs.
This plan called for a D -2 air strike of all Cuban air
fields, communication centers, bridges, strategic road
junctions, and tank and artillery emplacements.

The plan

was almost identical to the Trinidad Plan except for the
location of the landing.

A dawn invasion would be supported

by another air strike in conjunction with air drops.
beachhead could be easily secured.

The

On one side of the bay
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were swamps.

On the other side of the bay were three good

beaches surrounded by heavily wooded jungles.

An air strip

was nearby and capable of handling B-26s and large transport
planes.

The site was away from any sizable town or military

detachment.44 Although still favoring the original Trinidad
Plan, the JCS felt that the Zapata Plan had the highest
probability of succeeding, although the plan was no less
conspicuous than the Trinidad Plan.

The operation had

perhaps a 50 percent chance of succeeding.

The JCS were not

unified in their support of either the Trinidad or Zapata
Plan.

The Joint Chiefs reviewed the alternatives and made

their recommendations based on the information provided by
the CIA.

The JCS based their recommendation on which

alternative had the highest probability of succeeding, not
on whether the plans would work.

Kennedy approved the

Zapata plan on 16 March and retained the power to call off
the operation at any time.45
Some senior administration officials objected to the
entire operation. Assistant Secretary of State Chester
Bowles vehemently opposed the operation.

The plan violated

the charter of the OAS in which no member of the
organization could use coercive, forceful actions upon
another member of the organization.

An American-sponsored

^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 12, pp. 1-2.
biggins, 98-99.
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attack would be in direct violation of this charter.

Bowles

felt that the American chances of success were limited.

If

the operation failed, Castro's prestige in the region would
grow.

He would solidify his position and receive greater

support from the Soviet Union.

Even if successful, tbc

operation would have an adverse effect on world opinion.
The possible gains were not worth the risks.46
Kennedy also heard arguments against the operation
from within his own inner circle of advisers.

Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, warned the
President that the Bay of Pigs was his first major foreign
policy decision.

It would easily wipe out the good will

created by years of work.

The possible negative diplomatic

repercussions should be considered prior to making a final
decision.47
Some on Capitol Hill knowledgeable about the plan
opposed the invasion.
concerned.

Senator William Fulbright (D-Ark) was

He thought that Kennedy had two options:

overthrow Castro, or tolerate his abuses and try to isolate
him.

Fulbright did not favor the first option.

It would

violate the charter of the OAS and was contrary to American
law.

If the overthrow were successful, the U.S. would be

burdened with maintaining support of a post-Castro
^Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep; Mv Years in Public
Life. 1921-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 327-28.
47Schlesinger, 240.
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government.

If that government were falling, the U.S. would

be forced to intervene unilaterally to prop it up.
Fulbright's opposition grew the more he was informed of the
operation:
To give this activity even covert support is of a
piece with the hypocrisy and cynicism for which
the U.S. is constantly denouncing the Soviet
Union in the United Nations and elsewhere. This
point will not be lost on the rest of the world—
nor on our own consciences.48
Fulbright favored isolation of Castro.

The Alliance for

Progress would be the perfect vehicle for ostracizing Castro
among Latin American leaders.

Fulbright succinctly stated

that "the Castro regime is a thorn in the flesh; but it is
not a dagger m the heart."
Even in the JCS there were vocal opponents to the
operation.

General David M. Shoup, Commandant of the Marine

Corps, an expert of amphibious operations, was the only
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed to the
operation.

He disliked foreign interventions.

In a

briefing to senior administration officials Shoup asked, "Do
any of you gentlemen know how big Cuba is?"

While he waited

for an answer, he proceeded to place an overlay of Cuba on a
map of the U.S.

Cuba stretched from Washington, D.C. to

Chicago, nearly eight hundred miles.

He then placed another

overlay with a red dot on it over Cuba.

He then stated to

^Schiesinger, 251.
49Ibid.
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the officials, "That, gentlemen, represents the size of the
island of Tarawa and it took us three days and eighteen
thousand Marines to take it."50
A decision had to be made, but only the President
could make it.

The JCS felt that it was necessary to remove

Castro from power, but the Zapata Plan did not meet their
desires.

There were too many weaknesses.

Only direct

military involvement would save the operation.
President was unwilling to go that far.

The

The CIA stressed

that the operation had gained so much momentum that it would
be difficult to cancel.

The pressure of having to act

forced the President into having to approve a plan about
which he did not feel comfortable.

It was a decision that

Kennedy wanted to avoid.
^Ranelagh, 364.
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CHAPTER THREE
A POOR PLAN POORLY EXECUTED
Prior to the development of the Bay of Pigs operation,
the Navy established a series of contingencies in the
Caribbean.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as Cuba's

dominant ally created critical strategic problems for
American naval planners.

Once Castro opened his ports to

Moscow and other eastem-bloc nations in I960, the perceived
threat of Soviet submarines and surface ships in the
Atlantic Ocean now extended to the Caribbean Sea.

It is

understandable that the Navy, in a strategic sense, favored
the removal of Castro.

A friendly neighbor in the Caribbean

reduced the need for strategic planners to concentrate
forces in that region.

American force planners had to

contend with a possible hostile neighbor on their southern
front.

U.S. submarine, air, and surface assets would have

to be pulled away from the primary threat region in the
Atlantic.
The Navy stepped up its activity in the Caribbean in
response to the perceived threat from Cuba.

A standing

Caribbean naval force was created consisting of a destroyer
squadron and a Marine Amphibious Ready Group homeported in
Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

An exercise consisting of an

67
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amphibious landing and naval gunfire was conducted in March
1961 on Vieques Island, off the southeast tip of Puerto
Rico.

Anti-submarine warfare exercises were conducted in

the Key West Operations Area using submarines from Submarine
Squadron Twelve.
Although directed not tc become involved in the
planning of the Bay of Pigs operation, the Navy did play a
major logistical role in the establishment of the Swan
Island communication site.

The CIA's Swan Island operation,

code named "Operation Crosspatch," depended heavily on the
support of the Navy.

Navy equipment and personnel were used

to help construct the radio station and airstrip on the
island.

The CIA originally intended that the Swan Island

project be considered a clandestine operation.

But the Navy

objected and asked that it be made into a "commercial"
station partly because of the Navy's role in establishing
it, but also because it would be difficult to remain
"clandestine" when the Cubans possessed radio direction
finding equipment capable of tracing the location of the
site.1 The CIA consented ard asked for an additional Navy
destroyer squadron to provide protection for Swan Island.
The Navy agreed to provide a few minesweepers.2
1Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 2, p. 1.
2Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Jr., USN (Ret), Interview
by Dr. John P. Mason, Jr., August 1975, Oral History
Collection, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis,
Maryland, 330-31.
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Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Commander in Chief,
Atlantic Fleet, [CINCLANT], was aware that the Caribbean
situation was heating up following the construction of the
Swan Island communication site.

Like Admiral Burke,

Dennison never received initial briefings on the training or
invasion aspects of the operation.
something was awry in November 1960.

He first heard that
Vice Admiral G. C.

Towner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet
[PHIBLANT], told Dennison that the commanding officer of the
USS SAN MARCOS (LSD 25), while in port at Roosevelt Roads,
was approached by two CIA men.

They asked if they could

"requisition" his ship to carry some landing craft and crew
from Vieques to a location off southern Cuba.

The CIA men

couldn't tell the commanding officer what the operation was
all about.

The commanding officer responded that he did not

own the ship and did not have the authority to allow the CIA
to "requisition" his ship.

He could not respond to the

request because he would have to check with his Navy
superiors.

Following Towner's briefing, Dennison was livid.

He called General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, to find
out what was going on.

Lemnitzer said, "Don't you know?"

Dennison replied, "I don't know anymore than I've already
told you.

What's it all about?

I'm not going to turn my

ship over to a couple of characters who say they're from CIA
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or any place else."3 Lemnitzer agreed to arrange a briefing
of the operation for Dennison.

On 2 November Bissell

travelled to Norfolk and briefed Dennison on the operation.
Dennison was not satisfied with Bissell's brief.
Dennision felt that Bissell was withholding information.
What was supposed to be done if Castro retaliated and made a
move on Guantanamo?

Dennison thought the plan was "stupid."

"I think any military man who had anything to do with it
could have told them the same thing.
approve anything.
direction of
done. . . . "

We weren’t asked to

We were just being told that this was by

the President and this was what was to be
He thought it was a riskyoperation that would

probably fail and the U.S. Navy would be asked to come to
the rescue.4
The entire
commander of

idea appalled Dennison. He was the

the Atlantic Fleet, yet he received no

intelligence support to assist him in the development of
operation orders, rules of engagement, and movement orders.
Following his briefing with Bissell, Dennison requested
specific intelligence support from the CIA.

The request

consisted of over ninety intelligence requirements on the
Cuban counter-revolutionary forces.
only twelve were fully answered.

Of the ninety requests,

The other information was

3Ibid., 332-33.
4Ibid., 333-35.
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sparse and provided limited information on Castro's forces.5
Dennison had to make do with what he had at his disposal.
There was little cooperation between the CIA and CINCLANT.
Dennison and his staff did not know what the CIA was doing.
Because of the limited intelligence on Cuba Dennison
relied on the dexterity of his staff to be able to draw
contingency plans for the operation.

There was such a cloud

of secrecy over the project that everything was passed by
word of mouth.

Although favoring the security aspects of

the operation Admiral Burke questioned the plan's
probability of success without supporting paper work and
discussion:
Very seldom are decisions made without paper work.
Decisions are made in conferences. Without the advice
of someone who knows there is [sic] no checks and
balances in the operation.6
CINCLANT planners were also skeptical.

An operation

conducted by word of mouth was not a good way to do
business.

The lack of written directives created a greater

probability of someone making a mistake.7 On 9 February
1961 Admiral Burke instructed members of his staff to travel
to Norfolk to give Dennison a status report of the
5Ibid., 339.
6Admiral Arleigh Burke, interview by author, 22
February 1988, notes from tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia.
7Aamiral Horatio Rivero, Jr., USN (Ret), Interview by
Dr. John P. Mason, Jr., March 1978, Oral History Collection,
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 333-34.
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operation.

The briefing consisted of a description of the

operation up to the arrival in the Amphibious Objective Area
[AOA]. Of particular emphasis was the use of the Navy LSD
and no ties to American involvement.

Again, Dennison

received no guidance on the measures necessary to protect
Guantanamo.8 Admiral Horatio Rivero, Jr., Dennison's Deputy
Chief of Staff, recalled, "All we had to do was to be
prepared to play some part which we weren't quite sure what
it was, at some time we weren't quite sure when it would be.
It was the most fouled up thing I ever saw."9
Following the severing of U.S.-Cuban relations,
American intelligence sources dried up.

The government was

unclear of the intelligence estimates of the strength of
Castro and his forces.

Soviet ships off-loaded at night.

Rumors were rampant concerning whether the Cubans possessed
Soviet MIGs, tanks, artillery, and communications equipment.
Intelligence-gathering was merely conjecture, a true
"crystal ball operation."

The Navy was forbidden to conduct

reconnaissance flights out of Guantanamo or Key West.
Roosevelt Roads was too far away to be an adequate
intelligence gathering center.

Dennison's primary concern

throughout the planning and execution phases of the
operation was the defense of Guantanamo.

Dennison countered

8Dennison, 341-43.
9Rivero, 333-34.
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the supposed growth of Castro's forces around Guantanamo by
deploying a Battalion Landing Team [BLT] and an Amphibious
Squadron [PHIBRON] to Guantanamo.

The USS Galveston

(CLG 3), a 6"-gun cruiser, moved from Roosevelt Roads to
Guantanamo.

An additional attack squadron was added to

Guantanamo.

Destroyers receiving refresher training

remained in Guantanamo indefinitely.10
CINCLANT planners could not narrow their field of view
to the defense of Guantanamo.

Key West was only ninety

miles from the coast of Cuba.

Dennison ordered the

commanding officer of the naval station to increase his
defense posture.

Dennison requested additional protection

from the Strategic Air Command [CINCSAC] through the JCS.
CINCSAC responded by conducting Exercise "Southern Tip" in
April 1961.

The exercise called for the Commander of the

North American Air Defenses [CONAD] to integrate forces from
all the services and add them to the defenses and
surveillance of the southern Florida region.

JCS directed

CINCLANT and CINCSAC to provide forces for the "exercise."
CINCLANT provided an additional carrier fighter squadron to
bolster Key West defenses.11
10Dennison, 338, 345.
11Ibid., 345; United States Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Memorandum 1899/649, 25 April 1961, Record Group 218, File
3144, Box 44, Sect. 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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In addition to the increased defense posture, Dennison
had other means of gathering intelligence.

The Navy

conducted frequent covert electronic surveillance off the
coast of Cuba.

During March and April 1961, the USS Perrv

(DD 844), homeported in Mayport, Florida, was temporarily
assigned to Key West Naval Station.

The Perrv was

electronically configured to conduct electronic
"eavesdropping," intercepting Cuban radio transmissions.
Additionally, the Perrv was equipped with electronic
equipment designed to transmit signals similar to those of a
task force.

At times the Perrv approached as close as three

miles to the coast of Cuba.

The Perrv navigated around the

coast of Cuba listening and transmitting signals to confuse
Castro's forces.

Several times the signals fooled Castro

into making his naval forces sortie in response to the
perceived threat of an invasion.12
Submarines in Submarine Squadron Twelve homeported in
Key West, were used to conduct surveillance missions of the
Cuban coast.

The USS Threadfin (SS 410) frequently

conducted coastal surveillance missions, missions to monitor
shipping in and out of Cuba, and special missions navigating
Cuban coastal waters for future references.

The Threadfin

12Admiral Arleigh Burke, interview by author, 16
September 1988, tape recording, Fairfax, Virginia; Captain
Lionel Krisel, interview by author, 12 September 1988,
telephone interview, Long Beach, California; USS Perrv (DD
849) Deck Logs, March-April 1961, National Archives and
Record Center, Washington, D.C.

i.
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played a major role in the operation later in April.13
On 24 March 1961 the JCS notified CINCLANT that there
would be a requirement to provide additional naval support
for "Operation Crosspatch," which was now the code word for
the entire operation.

The JCS directed CINCLANT to use one

destroyer to escort the CEF ships from Central America to
the rendezvous point five miles off the coast of Cuba.
After arriving at the rendezvous point, the destroyers were
not supposed to come any closer than three miles to the
coast.

A Navy dock landing ship (LSD) would be used to

transport three utility boats (LCUs), and four motorized
personnel carriers (LCVPs) of the Cuban Expeditionary Force
[CEF] from Vieques to the rendezvous with the other brigade
ships.

Naval air cover would be provided for the CEF ships

from sunrise to sunset while enroute to the AOA.

D-Day was

scheduled for 5 April 1961.14
On 28 March CINCLANT notified JCS that an anti
submarine warfare exercise was scheduled between 3-18 April
in the Gulf of Mexico.

The anti-submarine warfare carrier

USS Essex (CVS 9), accompanied by USS Murray (DDE 576), USS
Waller (DDE 466), USS Conv (DDE 508), USS Conway (DDE 509),
USS Bache (DDE 470), USS Beale (DDE 471), and USS Eaton (DDE
510), would participate in the exercise.

Dennison proposed

13Krisel interview, 12 September 1988.
14Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, p. 1.
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using two destroyers in mutual support of the CEF, defending
against surface and air attacks, and to act as "shepherding"
units in case any of the brigade ships became separated.
Dennison notified the JCS that he had already deployed the
standing Caribbean amphibious squadron to the area.

An

additional eighteen destroyers were scheduled to receive
refresher training between 3-17 April.

Jet fighter

squadrons were deployed to Key West and Guantanamo.

In

order to avoid any appearances of increased U.S. presence in
the area, Dennison scheduled a port visit for the Marine
Battalion Landing Team to Jamaica on 13 April.
In the preliminary Rules of Engagement [ROE] submitted
to JCS, CINCLANT recommended that in the event a Cuban naval
vessel or suspicious unknown vessel attempted to close the
force, the escort destroyers would maneuver to remain
between the vessel and the CEF ships.

The Cuban or unknown

vessel would be warned not to approach any closer than gun
range of tha convoy.

If the craft continued to close the

formation, a warning shot would be shot across the bow.

If

the contact closed within two thousand yards or opened fire
on the convoy, the Navy ships would be authorized to open
fire until the ship either would surrender, retire, or be
destroyed.
The ROE contained instructions for combat air patrols
and air controllers.

Combat air patrols would identify any

aircraft approaching radar range.

If the aircraft were
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Cuban, the combat air patrol would make a fly-by to make
sure the Cuban aircraft would be aware of the American
presence.

If the Cuban aircraft continued to close the

force, the U.S. combat air patrol would continue to make
attempts to divert the supposed hostile threat.

If the

Cuban aircraft were to make attempts to get into a position
to attack the convoy, authorization would be granted for the
combat air patrol to fire on the Cuban aircraft.
The concluding recommendation from CINCLANT was a
planner's ominous forewarning.

The code name "Operation

Crosspatch" was already used to describe the Swan Island
operation.

In order to avoid any confusion CINCLANT

recommended changing the name of the U.S. naval aspects of
the operation to "Operation Bumpy Road."15
On 1 April 1961 the JCS approved CINCLANT's ROE in JCSM
363-61.

All aspects of the ROE were approved and additional

directions were inserted concerning the possible presence of
Soviet submarines.

In the event that the convoy were to be

shadowed or closed by a surfaced submarine, it would be
treated as a surface ship.

If the submarine was submerged,

the destroyer escorts would request the unknown submarine
contact to identify itself.

If the submarine failed to

identify itself after a second request, the escort ships
would warn the contact that it would be attacked if it
15Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab A, pp. 1-4.

L.
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failed to do so.

If the submarine still failed to identify

itself, the escorts were to treat the submarine as if it
were preparing to attack.

Permission would be given to

attack the submarine using all authorized means possible
until it either would retire, surface and identify itself,
or be destroyed.

JCSM 363-61 also approved changing the

code word of the Navy's involvement in the operation to
"Operation Bumpy Road."16
Monday, 3 April 1961, appeared to be a routine day at
the Destroyer-Submarine Piers, Norfolk Naval Station.

The

skies were clear with the temperatures approaching fifty
degrees.

The Murray, Eaton. Cony, Conway, Bache. and Beale

were making preparations to get underway for what was
thought to be anti-submarine warfare operations off the
coast of Rhode Island.

The ships were part of Destroyer

Squadron Twenty-Eight of the Anti-Submarine Warfare HunterKiller Force Atlantic under the flag of the Rear Admiral
John Clark, Commander, Task Group 81.8.

The routine

steaming schedule consisted of two weeks underway trying to
locate and identify Soviet submarines in the Atlantic.

The

underway period was followed by two weeks in port for
maintenance and upkeep.
the inport period.

The underway cycle continued after

Operations were routine and this

appeared to be another typical underway period.

Underway

16Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab B, pp. 186-87.

Il
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time for the ships of Destroyer Squadron Twenty-Eight was
between 0830 and 1C00.17
Once underway the Eaton led the formation out of the
Thimble Shoals Channel.

At 1225 the Murray and Eaton

rendezvoused and took station on the Essex and proceeded
south with the other ships in the formation following
behind.

The transit was uneventful.

Drills at general

quarters, gunnery exercises, steering casualty drills, and
small arms practice filled the ships' schedules.

At night

the Murray and Eaton conducted flashing light drills, a
normal underway exercise between two ships.

What made this

exercise different was that the flashing lights on the
signal bridges were jury-rigged so that they could be
controlled by the Combat Information Center to be used as
search lights.

Under the supervision of Captain Robert

Crutchfield, Commander, Destroyer Division 281, on board the
Eaton. the ships took turns trying to locate each other in
the darkness.

The ships conducted this exercise throughout

the transit.
Once the squadron arrived off the coast of
Jacksonville, Florida, it became obvious that the operation
was no longer a typical anti-submarine sweep in the
17Captain William Smoot, USNR (Ret), Interview by Dr.
John P. Mason, Jr., 3 April 1973, Oral History Department,
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 1-2; USS
Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 3 April 1961, National Archives
and Record Center, Washington, D.C.
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Atlantic.

The Essex, normally configured to handle anti

submarine warfare S-3 aircraft had been modified to land and
launch A-4D fighter/attack aircraft.

The squadron of A-4Ds

landed on board the Essex on 5 April.

Questions concerning

the presence of the A-4Ds on the Essex remained unanswered.
The operation was cloaked in secrecy.

The only thing

obvious to the crews of the ships was that the formation
remained on a southerly course throughout the transit.

No

one was allowed to see the navigation charts with the
exception of the Commanding Officer, and the Executive
Officer, who plotted the ship's position and determined
courses and speeds required to stay on track.18
The secrecy continued as the squadron proceeded
westward past Key West and into the Gulf of Mexico.

On 7

April the squadron received fuel from the USS Elokomin (AO
55).

During the refueling evolution the Murray received

Lieutenants (Junior Grade) James W. Corey and Robert W.
Sickles from the Elokomin by high-line transfer.

Personnel

transfers were common and quite frequent during
replenishment details.

But Corey and Sickles' presence

raised suspicions among the crew of the Murray. They were
specially trained air traffic controllers.
event took place later that afternoon.
conducted towing exercises.

Another unusual

The Murray and Eaton

Exercises like these are not

18Smoot, 2-3.
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ordinary or common.

They are time-extensive and require

deft ship handling.

There was little margin of error when

towing another vessel.

The exercise lasted for

approximately two hours with each ship taking turns towing
the other.19
While Task Group 81.8 was in transit to the Gulf of
Mexico, discussions continued in Washington concerning the
Navy's ROE.

Secretary McNamara received a briefing from the

JCS and was told that once the President gave the go-ahead
for the operation, the ROE would be submitted for his
approval.

After discussing the ROE with the Joint Chiefs,

McNamara felt that too much authority was given to the
individual lower levels of command.

Another concern dealt

with the possibility of the U.S. being seen as an active
participant in the operation.

McNamara directed the JCS to

ensure that there was no way the U.S. would become overtly
involved in the operation.

Following a meeting with General

Lemnitzer, Dulles, Bissell and General Charles P. Cabell,
Deputy Director of the CIA, McNamara stated that if the U.S.
were drawn into supporting the CEF in transit the operation
would be called off and the CEF forces would be directed to
a port chosen by the CIA.20
19USS Elokomin (AO 55) Deck Logs, 7 April 1961,
National Archives and Record Center, Washington, D.C.; USS
Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 7 April 1961.
^Taylor Report, Annex 29, p. 1.
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Even though the ships were already underway, the JCS
notified CINCLANT that D-Day was postponed on 5 April for at
least forty-eight hours.

This was too late to stop a

scheduled anti-submarine sweep of the Central American
coast.

On 6 April Kennedy was uncomfortable with the size

of the operation.

He expressed his desire that all efforts

be made to keep the American presence in the operation at as
low a profile as possible.

Precautions needed to be made to

insure that U.S. support for the CEF was not apparent and
that the U.S. could "plausibly deny" any participation in
the operation.

Acting on the President's directives the JCS

modified the ROE in JCSM 179-61.

The Navy would provide

area coverage rather than convoy protection for the CEF
ships.

During daylight hours the escorting destroyers would

maintain a practical range ahead of the force and steer
courses and speeds in such a way as to maintain protection
but not appear to be screening.

During the night the

destroyers would take station close enough to provide
adequate protection.

The Chiefs reiterated that there would

be no Navy support for the landing.

The only direct aid

would consist of the San Marcos transitting to "Point
Oldsmobile" to rendezvous with the CEF ships and drop off
the brigade's landing craft.

"Point Oldsmobile" was a point

approximately five miles off the coast of the Bay of Pigs
where the CEF ships lined up for their approach to the
beach.

The escort destroyers, after leading the CEF to the
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landing area, would withdraw to "Point Packard," a point
approximately 125 miles south of the AOA, just north of the
Cayman Islands.

This point would be the "MODLOC" point,

that location where the Navy ships would remain during the
operation and the Essex would conduct flight operations.
Prior to the rendezvous with the CEF ships, the commanding
officers of the destroyers were directed to intervene only
if it would protect the ships from attack or capture.

The

Navy would open fire only if the CEF were to be attacked.
The new ROE authorized the destroyer commanding officers to
stay between the convoy and any Cuban craft or suspicious
vessels.

The commanding officers were authorized to warn

the ship to stay out of range.

If it failed to do so, the

destroyers were directed to "intervene as necessary."21
Combat air patrol and air controllers received similar
instructions as did the surface ships.

The combat air

patrol could not appear to be protecting the CEF.

Other

guidelines were similar to previous ROE's with the exception
that if the Cuban aircraft ignored repeated warnings and
continued to close the force and appeared ready to attack
with its bomb bays open the friendly combat air patrol could
attack.

The other major issue of the directive was that D-

Day was postponed again.

The new D-Day was set for 17

21Taylor Report, Annex 29, Tab C, Enclosure F, pp. 1-2.
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April.22
On 12 April the Essex and its escorts turned south to
leave the Gulf of Mexico for its rendezvous with the CEF off
the coast of Nicaragua.

As of that date the commanding

officers in the squadron were directed by Rear Admiral Clark
to omit any information dealing with the operation from the
deck logs and insert the term "Special Operations" into the
ship's position block.

Some ships, such as the Murray.

maintained course and speed changes, daily ship's routines,
replenishment details, and special evolution entries in the
deck logs.

The Elokomin was not attached to Task Group 81.8

and kept the deck logs intact.

The Elokomin refueled every

ship in the squadron, including the Essex, and annotated the
deck logs accordingly.
This emphasis on security remained paramount during
the transit.

The White House and CIA insisted on minimizing

the American presence in the operation.

Each ship was

directed to paint over the ship's hull numbers and name.
Stack markings were also to be painted over.

After

considerable cross-deck briefings from Rear Admiral Clark,
the commanding officers complied with the directive.23
Even as the squadron proceeded to the rendezvous with
the CEF, the final plans for the operation were still not
“ ibid., 2-3.
^ S S Murray (DD 576) Deck Logs, 14 April 1961.

k.
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ironed out.

The plan differed drastically from the original

concept of March 1960.

In early April the plan called for

limited air strikes on D -2.

At the same time a

diversionary landing would be conducted in Oriente Province
in eastern Cuba.

The air strikes would be conducted by

Cuban pilots "defecting" from the Cuban Air Force.

The

defection story was intended to reduce the likelihood of the
U.S. being tied to the operation.

The D-Day landing would

appear to be generated by support from within Cuba.

Admiral

Burke did not support the defection story or the D -2 air
strikes because of the attack's "indecisive nature" and the
danger of prematurely alerting Castro's forces.

The CIA

favored D-Day air strikes instead of the D -2 defection air
strike.

But "political advantages" proposed by the State

Department forced the inclusion of the D -2 air strikes,
even though the main emphasis of the operation remained on
the D-Day air strikes.24
In a meeting with Kennedy, McNamara, and other
National Security Council [NSC] officials on 12 April,
Bissell outlined the latest changes to the plan and
formulated the final time line.

On D -7 the main force

would be staged in Puerto Cabezas.
completed by D -5.

Staging would be

On the morning of D -6 the first vessels

would sail from Puerto Cabezas.

The last vessel was

24Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 12-13.
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scheduled to depart in the early morning hours of D -4.

On

D -2 a limited air strike conducted by "defectors" would be
launched from Retalheu.

On the night of D -1 the airborne

company would be loaded aboard transport aircraft in
Retalheu.

The main landing on D-Day would be accompanied by

another series of air strikes.

Two B-26s and a liaison

plane would drop propaganda leaflets and then land on the
captured air strip.
established.

A provisional government would then be

The CEF ships would return to the beach on the

morning of D+l to complete the discharge of the supplies.
On D+7 another diversionary landing was scheduled to take
place in Pinar del Rio.

After the briefing Kennedy was

hesitant to give the final go-ahead to the plan.

Bissell

advised the President that the "Go— No-Go" date for the air
strike was 1200 14 April and 1200 16 April for the main
landing.25
The Essex battle group arrived off the coast of
Nicaragua on 14 April.

Each ship was assigned a sector to

cover for the final transit of the CEF naval forces to Cuba.
The Blaaar was the command and control ship of the CEF
forces.

Other ships in the brigade included the Rio

Escondido. Houston. Santa Barbara. Barbara J . Caribe. and
Atlantico. The Navy was warned prior to the rendezvous by
General Cabell to minimize American visibility.

Again, the

^Ibid., 14.
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ROE changed.

Actual engagement of Cubans needed to be

avoided at all costs until the very last minute and only
after it was clear that failure to respond would jeopardize
all of the CEF ships.

Allowing the Cubans to fire on the

CEF ships was now acceptable and the Navy should wait until
Castro's forces "honed in for the kill."

Every effort

should be made to not "blow the operation by overly active
intervention."

The original concept of the operation was to

provide support so that the operation would not fail.

The

concept was modified so that it could be cancelled at the
last minute.

The concept was further modified by warning

that the mission would be aborted if the Navy had to
intervene.

The JCS stressed to CINCLANT and each commanding

officer in the squadron that the Navy's involvement should
not be the reason for aborting the mission:
It is desired to minimize the need to abort the
operation, because of U.S. engagement of Castro's
ships or aircraft in combat in [the! conduct of [the]
protective mission assigned to you.
Once the Essex and its escorts rendezvoused with the
CEF ships, the force headed for Cuba.

During the first

night of the transit, troops on board the Atlantico were
conducting gunnery practice with small arms and .50 caliber
machine guns.

One man was killed and two were seriously

wounded whan one of the .50 caliber machine guns fell off
its mounting pod and discharged.

The Eaton pulled alongside

^Taylor Report, Annex 29, Tab D, pp. 1-2.

I.
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and the wounded men were transferred for emergency surgery.
One man had a serious wound to his stomach and the other had
one of his heels shot off.

The Navy surgical team on board

the Eaton conducted the emergency surgery on the two
soldiers prior to evacuating them to Guantanamo.27
Prior to arriving in the objective area, the Eaton
picked up one CIA agent and four Cuban UDT personnel.

The

CIA agent, Grayston Lynch, was supposed to lead the Cuban
UDT team on to the beach prior to the invasion.

The UDT was

used for reconnaissance and beach preparations.

The team

was to be sent to the beach by the Threadfin. but Lynch's
claustrophobia kept him from travelling in a submarine.

The

team then transferred to the Eaton for further
transportation to the beach.28
The operation commenced on D -2, 15 April 1961.
Kennedy gave the go-ahead from his retreat at Glen Ora,
Virginia.

Kennedy wanted to reduce the size and visibility

of the operation and directed the CIA to cut the air strike
composition from fourteen to eight B-26 bombers.

The

bombers struck the air fields at Campo Libertad, San Antonio
de los Banos, and Santiago de Cuba.
Campo Libertad.

Three B-26s attacked

Two attacked San Antonio de los Banos,

while the remaining B-26s struck Santiago de Cuba.

Initial

27Smoot, 6-7.
^Ibid., 8-9.

fc.
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battle damage assessments reported that 50 percent of
Castro's air force was destroyed at Campo Libertad.

Losses

at San Antonio de los Banos were reported at 75 percent to
80 percent of the air forces on the ground.

The destruction

at Santiago de Cuba included two B-26s, one DC-3, one
Lodestar, and one T-33.

Follow-on photographic studies and

interpretation revealed that the initial reports were
exaggerated.29 Castro's air force survived the initial air
strike.
A second air strike was scheduled to commence at dawn
of D-Day to wipe out the remainder of the Cuban Air Force.
Problems and confusion arose which resulted in the second
air strike being cancelled.

In order to placate the State

Department and make the invasion look like it was generated
from within Cuba a fake "defector" story was established in
which a so-called defecting Cuban Air Force B-26 would flee
to Florida following an attack on Castro's installations.
The defection was supposed to coincide with the initial air
strike.

During the initial air strike the B-26 "defector"

with Cuban Air Force markings piloted by members of the CEF
landed in Miami.

But on Saturday, April 14, a genuine

defector landed in Jacksonville, Florida.

To add to the

confusion a B-26 involved in the initial attack crash landed
at Key West Naval Station.

The "defecting" B-26, piloted by

^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 15; Part III,
Annex 22, p. 2.
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Captain Mario Zuniga, landed in Miami after a direct flight
from Nicaragua.

The plane was riddled with bullet holes.

Zuniga told reporters that he was a defecting pilot from the
Cuban Air Force.30 The plane was photographed with the
Cuban Air Force markings clearly visible and the bullet
holes in the engine and fuselage.

The "defection" story and

photographs were released to the press.

Two days earlier,

Dr. Raul Roa, Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations, warned
that such an attempt to mask U.S. involvement in a planned
invasion was imminent.

Roa claimed that exile operations

sponsored by the U.S. were in progress and Swan Island
continued to broadcast anti-Castro propaganda with the
assistance of the CIA.

Following the initial air strike Roa

called for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council
tc voice Cuban protests over the U.S.-sponsored aggression.
At the U.N. session, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, kept
uninformed by the State Department and White House
officials, defended the "defection" story supported by the
statements of the defecting pilot and pictures of the B-26.
The CIA committed several blunders which left Stevenson in a
position of defending a questionable story.

The B-26 in

Miami had a plexiglas nose while the Cuban Air Force's B-26s
had opaque noses.

The tail guns were removed in order to

place additional gasoline tanks for the long flight from
30

Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York:
Harper & Row, 1971), 1356-57.
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Nicaragua.

Tape covered the gun nuzzles and the bomb racks

were corroded.31 Stevenson's account of the defection was
easily disputed by Roa.
Stevenson received a briefing on the truth behind the
entire operation only after his credibility was placed on
the line for having to defend the American position against
the charges of the Cuban Ambassador.

Stevenson felt shunned

by Washington because his credibility in the diplomatic
community was disregarded.

On Sunday, 16 April, Stevenson

was furious that he had been led to push the defection
story.

He travelled to Washington to object to Kennedy and

insisted that any further air strikes be cancelled.32
Kennedy's foreign policy advisers supported Stevenson's
contention to cancel the follow-on air strikes.

The cover

on American involvement was blown after the initial air
strike.

China and the Soviet Union warned that the raids

threatened world peace and hinted that there might be some
sort of intervention in support of Castro.

Latin American

leaders, although wary of Castro and willing to support
attempts to remove him from power, were concerned that they
were not informed or consulted on the American decision to
31Warren Hinckle and William Turner, The Fish is Red;
The Story of the Secret War Against Cuba (New York: Harper
& Row, 1981), 262.
■^John Ranelagh, The Aaencv: The Rise and Decline of
the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 368.
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carry out the initial air strike.33 After receiving a
briefing of the day's events from National Security Adviser
McGeorge Bundy and finally bowing to the pressure of his
advisers, Kennedy cancelled the second air strike on the
night of 16 April.
Kennedy did not understand the significance of the
second air strike and what kind of repercussions it would
have if it were allowed to go on or if it were cancelled.34
As the operation began and progressed, the cancellation of
the second air strike and the failure to eliminate Castro's
air force would be crucial in the demise of the operation.
Also of great magnitude was Kennedy's failure to receive
from the JCS a wide-scope of advice on the pros and cons of
cancelling the raid.

Encircling himself with his closest

advisers shielded Kennedy from a full perspective of the
potential negative ramifications of his decision.35
The Presidential directive to cancel the second air
strike was not received in Central America until 2200, 16
April.

As originally scheduled, the second air strike was

supposed to coincide with the invasion.

Had Castro's air

force been occupied with the incoming air strike, the
^Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York:
1965), 301; Hinckle and Turner, 87.

Harper & Row,

^Stewart Alsop, The Center: People and Power in
Political Washington (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 22324.
^Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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invasion force night have had fewer obstacles to encounter
in the initial hours of the landing.

The Joint Chiefs did

not receive word that the second air strike had been
cancelled until Monday morning.

Admiral Burke was notified

when he arrived at the Pentagon War Room early Monday
morning after the invasion had already commenced.

General

Lemnitzer dejectedly said, "Blithely cancelling the most
critical operation in the whole campaign without ever
telling us or consulting us [was] indicative of the whole
operation."3® Burke was even more upset:
Kennedy didn't want to take military advice because he
didn't want to take military action. [Kennedy] was
afraid that if the military people got involved
[American participation] would grow. It usually does.
If you use physical power you have to use the military
and it's dangerous. The President wanted to do
something that had great effect with no danger. But
things don't come that way.37
The failure to conduct a second air strike was not the
only major blunder as the operation started.

The

diversionary landing scheduled to coincide with the initial
air strike never occurred.

The Santa Ana, with a group of

160 men led by Nino Diaz, was supposed to land thirty miles
east of Guantanamo to divert attention from the main
landing.

Once ashore the group would organize guerrilla

^Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and
his Joint chiefs of staff" (Ph.D. diss., University of South
Carolina, 1981), 196; Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1,
pp. 17-18.
37Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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activity in the province.

The diversionary landing was

supposed to draw Castro's forces to the east and confuse his
command.

But the plan did not go as originally intended.

On the night of 15 April the Santa Ana pulled up to the
beach.

Diaz' reconnaissance team went ashore.

They

returned claiming that there were strange lights on the
beach and the party of sympathizers arranged to coordinate
the landing never appeared.

In their efforts the team lost

two of the reconnaissance boats.

Diaz decided to pull the

Santa Ana out to sea and wait until the next night.

The

following night the operation was aborted because the
remaining reconnaissance boats broke down and it took too
long to recover them.

After the second night's aborted

mission the CIA ordered Diaz to proceed to the Bay of Pigs
and join the invasion.

The general conclusion of those

involved in the conduct and evaluation of the operation was
that Diaz turned-tail when faced with opposition.

His weak

leadership was the cause for scrapping an integral part of
the operation.

Without a diversion Castro had the resources

necessary to concentrate his forces in the central landing
area. 38
The hope that the initial air strike would spur on a
general rebellion from within Cuba never materialized.
Castro had created an effective organization, the Committee
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 22, p. 3.
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for the Defense of the Revolution, to police the Cuban
populace.

Its responsibilities included civil patrols

intended to keep an eye on those suspected of being opposed
to the revolution.

Following the air strike Castro used the

intelligence provided by the Committee to round up over
50,000 suspected guerrillas and sympathizers.39
The main invasion began at the Bay of Pigs with little
chance of success.

There was no air support, diversionary

attack, or popular support for the invading forces.

At

approximately 0100 17 April, the Eaton . accompanied by the
Murray. landed the first Cuban UDT team lead by CIA agent
Lynch.

The Blaaar. followed in a column formation at 800

yard intervals by the Caribe. Atlantico. Barbara J . Houston.
and Rio Escondido, headed to the beach.

Red Beach was

located at

the northern tip ofthe bay.

Blue Beach was

located on

the eastern

side ofthe bay.

located on

the eastern

seawardside of the bay.

from the beach

the San

Green Beach was
Five miles

Marcos appeared in the darkness.

After rendezvousing with the force, the San Marcos off
loaded the LCUs and LCVPs.

The landing craft went alongside

the CEF ships to off-load the brigade.

After the off-load

the San Marcos departed from the objective area.

The

Barbara J and Houston left the column and proceeded to Red
Beach.

The Blaqar. Caribe. and Rio Escondido, moved to

"^Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel
Castro (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), 97.
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within two miles of Blue Beach to send in other UDT teams.40
The Atlantico headed for Green Beach.

The Navy vessels

proceeded south to rendezvous with the Essex approximately
125 miles south of the bay.

Following the rendezvous they

refueled with the Elokomin and assumed duties as escorts for
the Essex and stand-by for possible anti-air warfare picket
duties for the CEF.

The Eaton and Murray proceeded back to

the bay after refueling.41
with the Eaton and Murray standing off the Bay of
Pigs, the landing started after the UDT teams moved ashore.
The town of Playa Giron on the bay was well lit.

The Cuban

UDT team observed men on the beach as they made their way
over the coral barriers in the bay.

A headlight shined on

the incoming team and Lynch fired on it.

Lynch radioed back

to the Blaaar about the incident and passed instructions to
expedite the off-loading.

Following a short fire fight

Blagar moved back among the coral reefs and allowed the
first wave of LCVPs into the beach.

The first LCVP in the

wave struck the coral about 75 yards

from the

beach.The

LCVP lowered its ramp and the troops

waded to

shore.At

0115 Brigade Commander Jose Perez San Roman went ashore and
40
•
•
•
*
Burke interview,
16 September 1988; Captain
Lionel
Krisel, interview by author, Telephone, 31 August 1988;
Taylor Report, Annex 27, pp. 3-4.

41USS Conwav (DDE 507) Deck Logs, 17 April 1961,
National Archives and Record Center, Washington, D.C.; USS
Elokomin (AO 55) Deck Logs, 17 April 1961.
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commenced unloading troops and supplies.

The UDT teams

warned the second LCVP of the coral and instructed it to
drop its ramp once it touched down and allow the troops to
move in.

As a result of their wading in the bay, all the

hand-held communications gear of the initial landing forces
was water-logged and inoperable, another variable that was
not considered by the CIA planners.

Information had to be

passed to the ships using the communications gear of the UDT
teams.

Lynch returned to the Blacrar to coordinate the

landing while the UDT's remained on the beach to prepare for
the landing of the LCUs.

By 0300 the unloading of the

troops from the Caribe was completed.

Because of the lack

of communication from Blue Beach to the surrounding beaches,
Atl&ntico was directed to make its landing at Blue Beach
rather than Green Beach.

Throughout the early hours of the

morning the UDT teams tried to find a way for the LCUs and
LCVPs to travel through the coral reefs.

Local fisherman

showed the way through and the first LCU arrived on Blue
Beach at 0600.

After the first LCU completed off-loading

the second LCU moved in.

By daybreak three LCU loads of

tanks, trucks, and other vehicles landed on Blue Beach.42
Like the landing at Blue Beach, there was little
opposition encountered at Red Beach as the 2nd and 5th
Battalions landed.

But problems arose when the troops from

42Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 19; Part III,
Annex 22, pp. 5-6; Part III, Annex 27, pp. 2-7.
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the Barbara J and Houston encountered considerable
difficulty getting ashore.

The boats that were supposed to

transport the troops to the beach broke down during the
start-up prior to the off-loading.

Of the nine boats

capable of transporting the troops to the beach, only two
worked.

The 5th Battalion never got ashore because of the

boat problems and a lack of initiative from the Brigade
Commander on the Houston. As a result, few supplies got
ashore.

Despite the logistical problems 2nd Battalion

secured Playa Giron and captured the local radio station.
By daylight the brigade secured Red Beach.43
At 0630 the Cuban Air Force responded.
strafed and the Houston was struck by rockets.
out in Number 1 and Number 3 holds.

Red Beach was
Fires broke

The crew extinguished

the fires and returned to try to continue off-loading the
troops, but the Houston was hit by two more rockets from a
Cuban T-33. The rockets struck the stern and knocked ou .
the ship's steering.

After losing its rudder the Houston

lost all steerageway.

The ship's master of the Houston

decided that it would be safest to beach the ship on the
west side of the bay about five miles south of Red Beach.
One squad of 2nd Battalion, all of 5th Battalion, and the
ship's crew abandoned ship.44
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 20.
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, pp. 19-21.
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Cuban air strikes were relentless throughout the
morning.

The CEF was virtually defenseless without air

support.

Cuban B-26s and T-33s strafed the beaches and

brigade ships with no opposition.
total control of the air.

Castro's air force had

The brigade's C-46s and C-54s

conducted parachute and supply drops in the midst of a
constant barrage of hostile fire without any air support.
Fighting on the ground was fierce as the parachutists of 1st
Battalion seized the road center of San Bias ten miles
northeast of Blue Beach, and the ingress points north and
east of the beach head.

On Blue Beach the brigade received

continuous strafing runs from the T-33s.

At 0930 the Rio

Escondido was hit and sunk by missiles shot from the Cuban
T-33s.

It carried ten days of supplies and ammunition, and

the communications gear for the brigade.

The sinking of the

Rio Escondido was a vital tactical loss to the brigade.
With depleting ammunition and no communications the brigade
faced numerous obstacles in maintaining the beachhead with
little likelihood of success.

Even though the brigade

secured the air strip at Playa Giron and the beaches
remained secure, continuous enemy air strikes forced the
brigade's ships to sea.45 Without ammunition or logistical
support from the ships, the brigade on the beach was in dire
straits as Castro increased pressure at the end of D-Day.
^Ibid.; Part III, Annex 27, pp. 8-9.
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After the Rio Escondido and Houston sank, the CIA
ordered the ships to head out to sea to a safe haven fifteen
miles off the coast that was to be provided by a picket line
of Navy destroyers and aircraft from the Essex. The Blaaar.
Santa Barbara, and Barbara J made their way to the safe
haven.

The Caribe and AtlAntico continued past the

rendezvous.

The Eaton and Murray chased the retreating

ships for approximately 130 miles before they threatened to
open fire on the CEF ships to make them stop.

Colonel J. F.

Mallard, USMC, the CIA Communications Officer on the Essex,
and Captain Crutchfield urged the masters of the Caribe and
Atlantico to return.

The masters refused to return to the

beach without a guarantee that there would be air cover for
the forces.

There was talk of mutiny among the crews of the

Caribe and Atlantico. After heated discussions with Mallard
and Crutchfield, the ships turned around and headed back to
the safe haver.
In order to prevent the unrestricted Cuban air strikes
on the beach, it was essential to eliminate or neutralize
Castro's air forces.

Kennedy agreed to allow the CIA to

coordinate a bombing run consisting of two waves of three B26s to hit as many air fields as possible with fragmentation
bombs.

At 1615 of D-Day the order was given to launch the

B-26s. Unfortunately the bombing runs failed because the B26s encountered considerable cloud cover and haze and the
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lights surrounding the targets were blacked out.46
Late on the night of D-Day and early D+l, the
AtlAntico returned to the AOA.

The Caribe was too far away

from the beach and never played a major role in the
remainder of the operation.

The Atldntico off-loaded its

cargo to the LCUs for the run into the beach during the
night time and was supposed to return before daylight.

The

off-loading took longer than expected and the LCUs could not
get to the beach before daylight.

The CIA in Washington

directed the Atl&ntico to keep the LCUs alongside and not
try to make the run to the beach.

The CIA attempted to get

supplies and ammunition to the beach by CEF air drops.

The

probability of sufficiently rearming the brigade was low.
The air drops were conducted by four C-54s and two C-46s.
Only five drops were successful.
jungle.

Some drops landed in the

Others landed in the water.47

The Eaton and Murray remained outside the coral reefs
during the operation and watched with futility as the
brigade was pushed back by the Cuban Army and Air Force.
The ROE from the transit remained in effect and there was
little the Navy could dc to assist the forces.

On the

morning of D-Day the JCS ordered Dennison and Clark to be
^Admiral Robert Crutchfield, interview by author, 31
August 1988, telephone, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Taylor
Report, Part III, Annex 22,
p. 7.
47Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, p. 11.

b*.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
prepared to provide unmarked combat air patrols for the CEF
shipping outside Cuban territorial waters.

The combat air

patrols were not authorized to provide protection inside the
AOA.

Clark was directed to create a picket line of early

warning ships no closer than thirty miles from the coast.48
At 0550 local time, the JCS stressed to Clark that the early
warning destroyers could not approach closer than the
thirty-mile limit and should be spread in a wide-spaced
picket line.

Again, the use of combat air patrol in support

of the CEF was not authorized.49
The sinking of the Rio Escondido and Houston changed
the complexity of the operation and the Navy's involvement.
By 1030 the Navy had already established the safe haven with
combat air patrol protection for the Cuban ships fifteen
miles off the coast. In the same message directing the
establishing of the safe haven CINCLANT received further
confusing modifications to the ROE.

No carrier operations

were allowed closer than fifty miles from the coast.

No

U.S. aircraft could come within fifteen miles of the coast.
There could be no more than four aircraft on station at a
time.

Hot pursuit was not allowed over Cuban territory.

U.S. aircraft could not close a Cuban aircraft unless it was
preparing to attack.

If any enemy aircraft were shot down,

^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, p. 2.
49Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab F, "JCS
Message 994222 to CINCLANT/CTG SI.8, 171050ZAPR61."
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every effort should be made to hide U.S. involvement.50 The
order from Washington baffled Dennison.

It told him exactly

how to establish the safe haven, how many destroyers to use,
and how to use the destroyers.

Until that time Admiral

Burke gave Dennison a great amount of flexibility and leeway
to "lean" on his orders.
to Clark.

Dennison passed this flexibility

The orders from the White House took away a great

amount of decision-making capability at the lower levels of
command.

In a phone call to General Lemnitzer, Dennison

said, "I've gotten a good many orders in my life, but this
is a strange one."

Lemnitzer did not understand what

Dennison was talking about.

Dennison explained, "Well the

last paragraph in it says that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
interpret this to mean, set up a safe haven.

This is the

first order I ever got from somebody who found it necessary
to interpret his own orders."
did you get this directive?"
from you."

Avenue."

Dennison replied, "I got it

Lemnitzer said, "Who do you think wrote it?"

Dennison replied, "You did."
didn't.

Lemnitzer responded, "Where

Lemnitzer answered, "No, I

That order was written at 1600 Pennsylvania
At this point Dennison was infuriated, "Well you

can tell 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue that I'm not going to do
it that way.

I'll do what they want done, but I'll use the

forces that I think are necessary.

They don't know what's

^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab G, "JCS
Message 994247 to CINCLANT, 172035ZAPR61."
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going on as much as I do."51 As expected, the Navy's
involvement increased.

The Navy received directions to make

preparations to come to the aid of the CIA.
At 0400 on D+l, 18 April, Castro's forces opened fire
on the brigade in the San Bias area north of the bay with
artillery.

Communications still did not exist between Blue

Beach and the outer perimeter of the beachhead.

Officer

couriers were used to shuttle messages from Blue Beach to
the battle areas.

The artillery fire continued and the

troops were forced to withdraw towards Blue Beach.

The

troops on Red Beach encountered a similar constant barrage
of artillery fire throughout the day.

In the early morning

tanks were seen approaching Blue Beach.

By 0730 the

worsening situation forced the troops on Red Beach to move
to Blue Beach.

The troop movement to Blue Beach was

completed by 1000.

They were given a few hours rest and

sent back to Red Beach.

At 0824 Blue Beach came under

attack from twelve tanks and four jet aircraft.
dwindled.

At 1010 Red Beach was overrun.

consolidated on Blue Beach.

Ammunition

The force

The Cuban artillery and air

strikes remained relentless throughout the brigade's
retreat.52 The heat of battle created a problem in the flow
of information to Washington and Norfolk.

Burke and

51Dennison, 351-52.
Baylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab G, "JCS
Message 99427 to CINCLANT, 172035ZAPR61."
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Dennison were not receiving accurate up-to-the-minute
information on the operation.

Kennedy authorized the Navy

to use unmarked aircraft to conduct photo and visual
reconnaissance.

The President directed the unmarked

reconnaissance planes to protect themselves only if
attacked.

Burke urged Dennsion and Clark to keep sending

updates and good intelligence to Washington.

Burke wanted

CINCLANT amphibious officers to review the intelligence
reports to ensure their accuracy.

The Essex closed the

coast on the afternoon of D+l to launch the reconnaissance
flights.53 At 1600 the Essex reported that a long line of
tanks and trucks were approaching Blue Beach from the east.
At 2000 the CIA asked San Romdn, the Brigade Commander, if
he wished to prepare to evacuate the brigade.
evacuate and said, "I will not be evacuated.

He refused to
We will fight

to the end here if we have to."54
The air battle over the beach head raged throughout
D+l.

American contract pilots were used to supplement the

Cuban pilots who were either too tired or refused to fly.
On the afternoon of D+l six sorties were flown from
Nicaragua against the column of tanks approaching Blue Beach
along the coastal road from the north.

Napalm bombs and

“Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab H, "JCS
Message 994309 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 181837ZAPR61."
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum I, pp. 22-23; Part
II, Third Meeting, 25 August 1961; Part III, Annex 22, p. 8.
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rockets were used to check the Cuban advancement.

Castro's

forces responded quickly to the changing threat and modified
their advances accordingly.

The Cubans slowly encircled

Blue Beach by the end of D+l.55
Admiral Burke grew increasingly frustrated with the
Cuban onslaught of the CEF.

Burke requested that the

President authorize the use of naval gunfire support to lay
down a barrage of fire on the approaching tanks.

Kennedy

asked Burke, "What if Castro's forces return the fire and
hit the destroyers?"
hell out of them!"

Burke responded, "Then we'll knock
Kennedy worried that the U.S. would then

be directly involved.
sir.

Burke responded, "We are involved,

Goddammit, Mr. President, we can not let those boys be

slaughtered out there!"56 Kennedy realized that the
operation was failing miserably.

Red Beach was lost.

Continuous air strikes and strafing of Blue Beach made the
brigade's predicament untenable.

Kennedy authorized the JCS

to prepare unmarked aircraft for combat use.

The number of

airplanes necessary to complete the job was left to the
discretion of Admiral Dennison and Admiral Clark.

Burke

ordered units from Amphibious Squadron Two located in the
vicinity of Guantanamo, to steam towards the Bay of Pigs.
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 23.
^Mario Lazo, "Decision for Disaster," Reader's Digest.
September 1964,
285; Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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In addition to the preparation of combat aircraft, Burke
ordered Clark to prepare unmarked naval boats for possible
use in evacuation operations.57
The last opportunity to get ammunition to the beach
was between the late hours of D+l and early hours of D+2.

A

C-54 landed at the air strip at Playa Giron to drop off
ammunition and pick up a wounded pilot.

The JCS informed

CINCLANT that unmarked U.S. Air Force C-130s might be used
for air drops.58 The C-130 air drops never materialized.
Even if they did take place, it would have been too little
too late.

Cuban forces closed off the beach and prepared

for the final push to the bay.
On the morning of D+2, 19 April, Kennedy sought an
opportunity to alleviate the pressure on the beachhead.

At

the request of the CIA, Kennedy directed the JCS to furnish
air cover consisting of six unmarked aircraft over the CEF
forces between 0630 and 0730 to protect against air attacks
from the Cuban air force.

The Navy was directed to provide

air cover and nothing else.

It could not strike at any

Cuban forces on the ground.

There could be no air combat,

only protection of the CEF Air Force if attacked.

The JCS

directive ordered Clark to make sure the pilots carried as
little identification as possible. If a Navy plane was shot
^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab I, "JCS
Message 994317 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 181947ZAPR61."
^Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, pp. 23-24, 28.
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and required ditching, the pilots were ordered to ditch at
sea.

Air drops were scheduled using C-46s between the hours

the Navy air protection was supposed to be on station.
While the air drops were in progress, CEF B-26s were
scheduled to attack Cuban tanks and artillery positions.
Clark also received notification that he should prepare to
conduct evacuation operations.

If so, he should move units

from Amphibious Squadron Two about thirty miles from the
beach by 1300 that day.

If needed, evacuations were

scheduled to commence at 1700.

Rescue boats had to be

unmarked with any identification that could tie the U.S. to
the operation removed.

The original directive from the

White House ordered the men of the rescue boats to wear
civilian clothes. In the event that the men were captured,
there could be no tie to the American naval involvement.
Dennison felt that the evacuation plan designed by the White
House showed no acknowledgement of the rights of the sailors
involved.

Without identification or names, the men, if

captured by the Cubans, could be treated as spies.

The men

would not be entitled to the protection guaranteed to
prisoner-of-wars under the Geneva Convention.

Dennison

disregarded the directive and instructed the crews of the
boat to remain in dungarees and carry no identification.

If

the evacuation was to be conducted using the Navy ships, air

k
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cover was authorized to protect the landing craft.58
Everything from the unmarked Navy jets to the unmarked Navy
rescue craft crewed by American sailors with no
identification made the entire evacuation process confusing
and difficult for the participants to implement. There was
no doubt that the U.S. was heavily involved.
difficult to hide American Navy ships inside

It is very
the bay trying

to conduct rescue operations.
That morning there was an error in determining the
time the CEF would conduct the air strike.
scheduled for 0630 Cuban time.
hour early.

The strike was

The CEF Air Force arrived an

Even though the Essex launched immediately, the

CEF already made its strikes against the beachhead and faced
considerable Cuban air opposition.60 If the Essex had
launched on time, the effectiveness of the strike so late in
the operation would have been doubtful.

Castro's forces had

already closed in on the beach.
The situation on the beachhead was hopeless for the
brigade.

Castro's air force controlled the air while his

tanks proceeded to the beach with little opposition.

The

CIA decided to prepare for the evacuation of the force.
There would be no more ammunition drops.

The CIA reasoned

^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab J, "JCS
Message 994369 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 190837ZAPR61;" Rivero,
335.
60

Taylor Report, Part II, Seventh Meeting, 01 May 1961,

p. 1.

I
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that three days of ammunition was taken ashore on D-Day and
air drops were conducted on that night.

Additional air

drops were made during the night of D+l and early morning
hours of D+2.

CIA leaders felt that it was a hopeless task

to ask for destroyer or air support.

Without overt U.S.

support, the loss of the CEF ships would be inevitable.
Based on these assumptions, they felt justified in calling
off the resupply effort by sea with the exception of one
last air drop on D+2.61
American volunteer pilots continued to be used
throughout the last hours of the operation.

A B-26 carrying

four American pilots was shot down early on Wednesday
morning, D+2. The four Americans, Wade C. Gray, Thomas Ray,
Riley Schlamberger, and Lee Barker, had been involved since
the initial air strike.

There was no way the U.S.

government could deny involvement ir. the operation once the
Americans were shot down.62
The troops in the San Bias region began a general
retreat to Blue Beach after encountering consecutive air
attacks and tank and artillery fires from the north and
east.

They could not stand the onslaught without

ammunition, supplies, and air cover.

At 1432, the Brigade

61Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 24.
Thomas, 1368n; Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure:
JFK. Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bav of Pias (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1987), 148.
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Commander sent the last message to Washington, "Am
destroying all equipment and communications.

I have nothing

left to fight with.

I cannot wait

for you."

Am taking to the woods.

Shortly after nightfall the resistance ended.63

Prior to the cessation of fighting, the Navy began the
evacuation operation.

Burke directed Dennison to send in

two destroyers to Blue Beach to check on the possibility of
evacuating the CEF.
were authorized.

Reconnaissance flights over the beach

Active air to air combat was allowed but

no attacks against ground forces were authorized.64
Dennison passed on the directions to Clark who coordinated
the rescue operation through Crutchfield on the Eaton. The
Eaton and Murray pulled into the bay to check for survivors.
After hearing that CEF soldiers were jumping into the bay to
swim to the ships, Burke ordered Dennison and Clark to
evacuate the force on Blue Beach to the best of their
ability.

In the message to Dennison, Burke expressed

concern about getting forces off the beach.

Burke passed to

Dennison, "We are extremely reluctant to become engaged but
as long as we have some prospects of saving significant
numbers of people to make hazards worthwhile, save the
people."

If the Eaton and Murray were fired on by Cuban

tanks or artillery, authority was given to protect
^Taylor Report, Part ill, Annex 22, p. 11.
MTaylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab K, "JCS
Message 994382 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 191657ZAPR61."
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themselves while on the "humanitarian mission."

If there

were large numbers that could be recovered, Clark was
ordered to inform the JCS as soon as possible so that they
could announce that the U.S. would assist in the
evacuation.65
While conducting the evacuation JCS warned CINCLANT to
standby to provide fighter support for the rescue effort.
CINCLANT directed the commanding officer of the Key West
Naval Air Station to prepare six unmarked F-3Hs for possible
use against Cuba.

Amphibious Squadron Two was directed to

get its ship's landing craft ready for the evacuation.

The

USS independence (CVA 62) task force, enroute to the
Caribbean, was ordered to speed up and stand off Guantanamo
and wait for further orders.

The ships in Guantanamo

sortied and prepared for action if necessary.66
On the night of 19 April the Eaton moved to the top of
the bay, almost running aground in the process.

Crutchfield

directed two junior officers from the Eaton to take the
motor whale boat and a rubber raft and go to the western
swampy side of the bay and pick up as many troops as the
boats could handle.

The officers took a signalman,

radioman, and boatswain mate with them to the beach.
were armed with rifles and .45 caliber pistols.

They

They were

^Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab L, "JCS
Message 994392 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 191812ZAPR61."
^Dennison, 354.
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ordered not to leave the boat but the waves were so choppy
in the bay that it was impossible to get people into the
boats.

They decided to land the boats.

The first group of

refugees included Gray Lynch, the CIA agent who participated
in the initial landing.

A total of seventeen survivors were

picked up in two nights of rescue operations.67
The rescue operations continued into Thursday night,
20 April.

The CIA operations officers on the Blaqar and

Barbara J . Lynch and William !:Rip" Robertson, had been
rescued off the beach and transferred to the Essex with
Crutchfield for debriefings with Admiral Clark.

After the

meeting, Lynch, Robertson, and UDT personnel were sent back
to the beach in the motor whale boat of the Eaton to check
on the validity of the information regarding survivors still
hiding in the bushes.

The rescuers used loud speakers and

searched the mangrove swamps on the western side of the bay.
With protection from the Navy destroyers and air cover,
Castro's helicopters stood off and observed the rescue
process.

It was difficult for the rescuers to convince the

survivors to come out of the swamps because of the
helicopters flying over the bay.

When they left the bushes,

they were transferred to the Eaton and then later to the
Essex.68
^Smoot, 15-20.
CO

Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 27, pp. 7-8.
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The Eaton. unaccompanied, pulled in as close to the
shore as possible.

Cuban tanks opened fire and bracketed

the Eaton. The Eaton moved out of the bay to get out of the
range of Castro's guns.

Late Thursday night the Eaton

returned and towed several amphibious barges out of the bay
and transferred them to ships of Amphibious Squadron Two,
USS Chilton (APA 38) and USS Thuban (AKA 19)•®9
Upon direction of Kennedy, Burke directed Clark to
take charge of the CEF and escort the ships to Vieques.
Continued destroyer patrols off Blue Beach were authorized
to search for possible survivors.

In what Crutchfield

called "one of the strangest" orders he had ever received,
Burke gave the commanding officer of the Eaton permission to
ground his ship without fear of any repercussions if it
would make the mission easier.

The Eaton was directed to

stay within sight of land during the night and outside of
Cuban guns during the day.

Crutchfield was directed to

repeat the patrols on 21 April.70 In retrospect, the order
to allow the commanding officer to ground his ship was not
strange at all.

Burke felt that at that stage in the

operation something as drastic as grounding the rescue ship
might facilitate the mission.

Burke was willing to use

military force to rescue the ship and suppress any Cuban
69Smoot, 14.
70Taylor Report, Part III, Annex 29, Tab N, "JCS
Message 994569 to CINCLANT/CTG 81.8, 210046ZAPR61," pp. 1-2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

threat.

The primary concern was the evacuation of any

survivors.

If the Cubans decided to open fire on the

American forces, Burke and Dennison were prepared to respond
militarily.

According to Burke, he was willing to support

the ships trying to rescue the survivors:
There is nothing worse than to be put out cn a limb
and realize that nobody gives a damn about wnether you
come back or not. I would have sent people in after
[them]. You've got to do that. You can't send people
into battle and say sacrifice yourself. Even if you
have to risk putting the nation at war. Or you don't
do a damn thing.71
The Eaton and Murray remained in the vicinity until
Saturday, April 22.

The ships of Task Group 81.8 began

arriving in Norfolk on 30 April with no fanfare.

The crews

were directed to refrain from talking about the operation to
anyone.

The cloak of secrecy was still in place and

remains, with some, to this day.72
71Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
^Krisel interview, 31 August 1988.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROFILES IN TIMIDITY OR WEAKNESS IN STRENGTH?
The remaining CEF ships left Cuba and sailed to
Vieques with their Navy escorts.

Contingencies such as the

lack of air superiority and logistical reinforcements played
major roles in the failure of the mission.

The Navy, having

warned of such contingencies, was asked to come to the
rescue of the operation after there was little chance of
reviving it.

The only thing that the White House could do

was pull back the forces and admit to the defeat.

Castro

glowed because he successfully gave the U.S. a black eye and
bloody nose.
After the debacle at the Bay of Pigs Kennedy quickly
accepted the blame for the failure of the operation.

His

willingness to accept responsibility diverted a great deal
of negative attention away from the White House.

In

conversations with his closest advisers Kennedy said,
"There's an old saying that victory has a hundred fathers
and defeat is an orphan."1 But behind closed doors Kennedy
was enraged by the perceived lack of support he received
from the CIA and JCS.

There were several holdovers from the

1Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York:
Greenwich House, 1965), 289.
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Eisenhower Administration, especially in the CIA and JCS.
Kennedy could handle the CIA.

He played with the idea of

appointing his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, to relieve
Dulles.

The military posed a greater problem to Kennedy.

Admiral Burke was a hero to Kennedy dating back to World War
II.

The Bay of Pigs taught Kennedy an important lesson.

Kennedy claimed that he would never again be in awe of the
military.2 In review of the Bay of Pigs operation, it seems
unfair to lay the. blame on the CIA and JCS.

In fact the

White House was just as responsible as any other party.
Kennedy asked former Army Chief of Staff General
Maxwell Taylor to come out of retirement and head a
committee to investigate the causes of the Bay of Pigs
fiasco.

Other members of the committee included the Robert

F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke.

The Taylor

Committee reviewed evidence, listened to testimony, and drew
a conclusion for submission to the President.
The Taylor Committee concluded that the causes of the
failure at the Bay of Pigs were widespread.

The sinking of

the Rio Escondido and Houston created a drastic shortage of
ammunition.

The Rio Escondido held ten days of reserve

ammunition.

The Houston should have been able to off-load

prior to being sunk, but the problems created by the failure
of the landing craft to operate and the general lethargy of
2Ibid., 289-90.
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the 5th Battalion were difficult to overcome.

The majority

of the forces' ammunition was concentrated on those two
ships.

Constant air attacks by the Cuban Air Force caused

delays in the transfer of supplies and replenishment to the
beach because the CEF ships were forced to head out to sea
to avoid being hit by enemy missiles.

The retreat of the

Atlantico and Caribe forced undue delays in the transfer of
supplies to the landing force.3
The Taylor Committee found that tne Cuban Air Force
maintained air superiority because the initial air strike
failed to destroy the airplanes on the ground, especially
the T-33s.

The need for secrecy placed restraints on the

anti-Castro air force.

The restraints included using B-26s

as combat aircraft because the B-26 was widely distributed
throughout the region, and therefore no clear ties could be
drawn to the U.S.

In order to remain covert, the operation

was limited to pre-invasion air strikes launched from nonU.S. controlled air fields.

Because the CEF had to use air

strips far from the objective area, pilot fatigue forced the
use of American contract pilots.

Restrictions on the use of

certain types of ammunition, especially napalm, hindered the
force's ability to neutralize and destroy its targets
3General Maxwell Taylor, "Taylor Committee Report and
Memorandum for the Record of Paramilitary Study Group
Meeting, Part I," Memorandum 2, John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston, Massachusetts, pp. 1-2. Hereafter cited as "Taylor
Report."
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because of the need to remain covert.
The most important conclusion of the Taylor Report
concerned the cancellation of the second air strike.
ramifications ran deep.

The

The cancellation wiped out the

possibility of eliminating Castro's air force.

The report

concluded that "the cancellation seems to have resulted
partly from [the] failure to make the air strike plan
extremely clear in advance to the President and Secretary of
State."

The Taylor Report concluded that the planners were

guilty of not forcefully informing the President of the
military repercussions of a last minute cancellation.
Because of its structure the Executive Branch was not
organizationally prepared to handle such a vast paramilitary
operation.

The report stressed that there was not a single

authority capable of coordinating the actions of the CIA,
Department of Defense, State Department, and the U.S.
Information Agency, short of the President.

The report

found that "top level direction was given through ad hoc
meetings of senior officials without consideration of
operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for
recording conclusions and [the] decisions reached."4
Based on their findings the committee noted that the
exiles fought well and inflicted considerable losses on the
Cuban forces.

Contrary to the view that control of the air

4Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 2, pp. 2-4.
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would be vital for the brigade to survive, the Cubans'
numerical superiority reduced the probability of success to
nil.

The limited numbers of B-26 pilots flying from

Nicaragua made continuous air support tenuous.

The option

of inserting guerrilla forces to undermine Castro's strength
was nearly impossible because of Castro's encirclement and
eventual forcing of the brigade back to the beachhead.
Under these conditions the beachhead could not have survived
without Cuban uprisings or overt American support.

Although

the guerrilla option could not succeed, with control of the
air, the brigade could have been evacuated by sea and air.5
The limitations on the operation reduced the
probability of success.

It was impossible for such a small

landing force to occupy a thirty-six mile beachhead.

With

no air support and a limited number of pilots, the CEF air
force had little chance of succeeding.

Even though the

intent was to infiltrate the jungles and head into the
Escambray Mountains if the operation failed, planners were
guilty of overlooking the fact that the Zapata region
primarily consisted of swamps and marshes and was located
over ninety miles from the mountains.

The President and

other senior officials were advised that it would be an easy
transition from an invasion force to guerrilla force.

The

JCS, for their part, reviewed the Zapata Plan and gave it a
5Taylor Report, Part I, Memorandum 1, p. 26.
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lukewarm approval, although they preferred the Trinidad
Flan.

The Taylor Report concluded that this point was never

brought up to administration officials.

As a body the JCS

reviewed the plan piecemeal and only within a limited
context.

Differing opinions among the JCS should have been

brought to the attention of the President.6
The Taylor Committee found that an operation such as
the Bay of Pigs was an example of a paramilitary operation
suited to the Cold War and that the country should be
prepared to engage in it.

If the country participated in a

paramilitary operation, it must do so with a high
probability of success.

The report stated,

Such operations should be planned and executed by a
governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play,
in addition to military and covert techniques, all
other forces, political, economic, ideological, and
intelligence, which can contribute to its success.
No such mechanism presently exists but should be
created to plan, coordinate and further a national
Cold War strategy capable of involving paramilitary
operations.7
The committee recommended the establishment of a Strategic
Resource Group supported by a Cold War Indication Center
which allowed the focusing the resources on the objectives
of the Cold War.® The establishment of such a group would
have effectively taken all paramilitary plans and operations
®Taylor Report,

Part

I,Memorandum 3, pp. 2-3.

7Taylor Report,

Part

I,Memorandum 3, p. 3.

®Taylor Report,
July 1961."

Part

I,"Letter to the President,13

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

out of the hands of the CIA and JCS and would have placed
them in the hands of a centralized command responding
directly to the President.
The Taylor Report is a historical document that gives
a detailed chronology of the Bay of Pigs operation.
its findings are questionable.

Some of

The committee was

established to explain to the President why tne Bay of Pigs
operation failed.

Opinions tended to hide the true

responsibility for the failure of the operation.

According

to Commander George Mitchell, aide to Admiral Burke who
attended the Taylor Committee sessions, "It was a complete
whitewash."

Mitchell claimed that the writing was on the

wall prior to the committee's convening.

It was not

intended to reveal the entire story, only what senior
administration officials wanted to hear.

Mitchell stated

that the Attorney General was regularly calling the
President to report on the meetings and the direction they
were heading.9 Burke understood the rationale behind the
Attorney General's actions:
Bobby Kennedy was not going to let his big brother
take any blame at all. He was protecting his brother.
That's natural. He was very ardent about it and very
good at it.10
9Captain George Mitchell, USN (Ret), interview by
author, 31 August 1988, telephone, Las Cruces, New Mexico.
10Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), interview by
author, 16 September 1988, tape recording, Fairfax,
Virginia.
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In an interview with journalist Hanson Baldwin, the Attorney
General tried to divert the blame away from the President
towards the JCS.

He stated, "Have you looked at the role of

the JCS in this?

They're the ones to blame.

You ought to

investigate that."11
Burke was so sure that the committee was trying to
blame the Navy that he directed the Navy Judge Advocate
General to prepare a defense that he could have in hand if
he needed it.

Admiral Burke did not want the Navy to

receive blame for what it did or did not do.12
The Taylor Report fails to stress several major
problems of the operation.

There was a shortage of

ammunition because the Rio Escondido and Houston were sunk
by Cuban missiles on D-Day.

The initial air strike was

supposed to destroy the Cuban Air Force.

The planned second

strike dealt with the possibility of having to attack those
aircraft not destroyed in the initial strike.

The

President's decision to cancel the second air strike allowed
the Cuban Air Force to maintain air superiority over the
beachhead.

The retreat of the Atl5ntico and Caribe was due

to the continued air strikes and lack of air support in
their defense.

Burke questioned the administration's

"Hanson W. Baldwin, Interview by Dr. John P. Mason,
Jr., September 1978, Oral History Collection, United States
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 679.
12Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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understanding of the threat of war and the ramifications of
their actions:
War is risky. The bigger the operation, the bigger
the risks. It's harder to accomplish. [You] can't
have an operation without danger.13
Even if the operation failed, with air support on hand, the
guerrillas might have been able to escape to the hills and
then on to the mountains.
Throughout the planning phases of the operation,
Kennedy was informed and advised of the nature of the air
strikes.

Throughout March and April, Bissell and Dulles

briefed the President and Secretary of State of the various
options available in the operation.

The failure of the

military and civilian planners "forcefully" to argue their
case to the President concerning the repercussions of
cancelling the second air strike begs the question:

how

"forceful" does one have to be when continually briefing the
President?

Burke and Bissell readily admitted that they

didn't "pound the desk" to voice their objections over the
cancellation of the second air strike.
their input would have been limited.

Even if they had,
By the end of D-Day,

information getting to and from the President was filtered
by his closest advisers.
reached the President.
to ride two horses."

Little if any military advice
Kennedy made the mistake of "trying

He was faced with arguments for and

13Ibid.

L.
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against the invasion.

Those opposed to Castro argued that

the invasion must take place and not fail.

Opponents of the

invasion argued that "masked aggression" was immoral.

The

problem was that the plan had little likelihood of success
and there was little chance of keeping U.S. involvement
covert.

Kennedy tried to compromise.14 In a life and death

situation like the Bay of Pigs there should be no
compromises.

If there were any doubts, Kennedy should have

stopped the invasion before it got underway.
In retrospect the CIA, JCS, the Navy, and the White
House should have shared responsibility for the failure.
The CIA underestimated the actual strength of Castro's
regime and forces.

Had the beachhead been secured and had

Castro been unable to drive the invading force cff the "beach
with his regime intact, a stalemate might have occurred.

In

that case the OAS would have been called in to act as an
intermediary and supervise negotiations.
not materialize as planned.

The operation did

Castro had more support from

the populace and military than the CIA expected.

The CIA

found that it was difficult to conduct such a large
amphibious campaign without support from within and without
14Victor Lasky, JFK:
Macmillan,
1963), 516.

The Man and the Myth (New York:
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Cuba.15 The CIA's failure to plan for such contingencies
was crucial to the operation's downfall.

The CIA concocted

the idea, planned it, reviewed it, evaluated it, and
executed it without the complete support of other
governmental agencies.

The CIA's double role as

intelligence gatherer and policy-maker hampered a truly
objective point of view.

There was no evidence of an

internal review of the plan.

The CIA "fell in love with the

plan and ceased to think critically of it."16
The JCS the Navy can be faulted for not adequately
informing the President of the pros and cons of the various
plans.

Although asked to review the plans, the JCS remained

in a position of observing another government agency's
operation.

Admiral Burke and the Navy allowed themselves to

become so intent on removing Castro from power that they
ignored the shortcomings in order to carry out the
operation.

The JCS might have reviewed and made

recommendations that would have made the plan work.

As the

chief military advisers to the President, that was their
responsibility.

The Joint Chiefs should have taken the plan

"down to the deck plates" to expose every weakness.

A risky

operation like the Bay of Pigs deserved scrupulous detailed
15Richard Bissell, Interview by Ed Edwin, 5 June 1967,
Oral History Research Office, Butler Library, Columbia
University, New York, 26-31.
16Karl Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion: The
Chronicle of Disaster (New York: Praeger, 1962), 104.
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examination.

Had specific details been raised, questions

and discussions would have created a greater flow of
communications between the interested parties.17 But the
Joint Chiefs were blinded by the possibility of removing
Castro from power.

Like the CIA, the JCS lost their

objectivity because of their desire to remove Castro.
A share of the blame has to be placed on Kennedy.

The

blame does not rest entirely on Kennedy because of his
decision to cancel the second air strike.

Rather, Kennedy

was at fault because of his failure to understand the true
uses and limitations of power.

Admiral Burke claimed that

Kennedy used power like it was a never-ending game.13 His
insistence that the CIA conduct the operation in complete
secrecy devoid of any overt U.S. involvement lacked sound
judgment.

Once military force is employed, its origins can

not be hidden by painting the hull numbers of ships, or
using unmarked Navy airplanes.

If a President uses force to

seek a political objective, he must understand the political
and military ramifications of his actions.

The Navy could

have made the plan work, but then Kennedy would have had no
way to hide American complicity in the operation.

In

hindsight, it might have made more political sense to back
17Jeffrey Graham Barlow, "President John F. Kennedy and
his Joint Chiefs of Staff.." (Ph.D. diss., University of
South Carolina, 1981), 177.
18Burke interview, 16 September 1988.
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out before the operation began.

Instead, Kennedy put

American prestige on the line by allowing the operation to
go ahead without the necessary military support. Kennedy
should have considered these options prior to giving the goahead for the operation.

Burke was correct in believing

that Kennedy did not understand the capabilities of force in
accomplishing a foreign policy objective.19 The appearance
of implied strength and the failure to take advantage of
- v

that strength created a lack of credibility and a strategic
political failure for the U.S. at
The Navy's participation in
faulted.

the Bay ofPigs.
the Bay of Pigs hasbeen

But in reality the Navy had been put into a

position of trying to make a poorplan work. Throughout

the

operation Admiral Burke's and Dennison's hands were tied by
the White House.

Burke was critical of those in positions

of responsibility who faulted the Navy even though he
thought the Navy did everything it could make the plan
succeed:
I don't think the Navy could have done anything better
under the circumstances. Of course there is always
room for improvement. There are always people who
should have been told that weren't. Always people who
were incompetent in the line of responsibility and
line of action that didn't do what they should have
done. [It] always happens. And always will. That's
why there's multiple resources in the military for one
man to pick up the ball if another man fails. He does
it automatically without anybody saying, 'It's your
turn now.' They do that. That's why the military is
more apt to be successful in operations that require
19Ibid.

L
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innovation and decisions on the spot than [are]
civilians. Civilians are not used to taking
responsibility for something they aren't directly
responsible for.20
Secrecy and security were more important than the conduct of
the mission.

Strategically, Burke and Dennison had strong

reasons for wanting Castro out of Cuba.

The administration

should have relied on military force coordinated by the JCS
and the Navy, not the CIA, if it wanted to seek the
political objective cf removing Castro from power.

It was

worth the use of American force to eradicate a strategic
threat from Cuba while suffering short-term political
setbacks.

The Navy had the opportunity to try to drive

Castro out of power, but there was a breakdown in the
relationship between military leaders and policy makers.
The policy makers in the administration were at fault for
failing to heed the advice of the military.

As a result,

Castro's regime was solidified even more after the Bay of
Pigs.

Kennedy's failure to support the invasion at the Bay

of Pigs gave Castro a strong dose of credibility in the eyes
of the world.

The fact remains that Castro remains in power

and Cuba appears to be firmly entrenched in the communist
camp for the indefinite future.
“ ibid.

L
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
When I began this project the first warning I received
was that there was very little information available.

The

possibility of "spinning my wheels" was always possible.
The warnings were correct.

There is very little

declassified information available concerning the Bay of
Pigs operation, especially from the Navy.

In addition to

the limitations on the amount of printed information
available, there are some people who still refuse to talk
about the operation in fear of breaching security.

Some

people talked to me on the grounds that I not publish what
they told me.

I agreed.

But in order to do a concise

perspective of the American naval involvement, I had to back
track from what I was told in confidence and try to verify
through other open sources.

To a certain extent, I was

successful.
My primary source of information was the Taylor
Committee Report.
study.

The report was the foundation of my

The report was still classified in many places, but,

through my interviews, I was able to piece together much of
the operation.

Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret), provided

insightful information from the perspective of the Joint

130
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Chiefs of staff (JCS).

Captain Lionel Krisel, USN (Ret),

Admiral Burke's historian of the Bay of Pigs operation,
provided information concerning the details of the operation
and those involved.

His thorough and concise information

filled many gaps in the operation cloaked in security.
Others involved in the operation were willing to
discuss their participation.

Admiral Robert R. Crutchfield,

USN (Ret), the on-scene commander at Bay of Pigs, provided
invaluable information that is not available in any
references.

Commander Jose Perez, USN (Ret), was a B-26

pilot for the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF). During the
Bay of Pigs operation he was shot down by Cuban anti-air
defense fire while conducting a strike on D-Day.

Following

the operation he came to the United States and joined the
Navy.

Commander Perez described the training aspects of the

operation followed by the air strikes and invasion.

Captain

James W. Griffin, USN (Ret), was the Commanding Officer of
the USS Tnreadfin (SS 410).

The Threadfin's missions were

cloaked in secrecy and Captain Griffin was reluctant to
discuss any of them.

Yet he did acknowledge that the

Threadfin was involved in the operation.
My most interesting interview, ironically, was the
least valuable.

Mr. Jack Pfeifer, until last year, was

Historian for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He is
currently involved in a lengthy legal dispute with the CIA
concerning information he researched while historian at the
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Agency.

The CIA has refused to release any information

concerning the operation.

His value, although not directly

pertaining to my study, centered around the various CIA
actions taken prior to, during, and after the failed
operation.
The Oral History Collection at the United States Naval
Institute was an invaluable source of information.

Dr. John

P. Mason, Jr., and Paul Stillwell's concise and indepth
interviews provided information on the operation from not
only the Navy's point of view, such as Admiral Horatio
Rivero, Admiral Alfred Ward and Admiral William Mack, but
also the press, such as the Oral History of news reporter
Hanson W. Baldwin.

The Oral History Collection provided

information that could not be attained through personal
interviews.
Pieces of the operation that could not be attained
from interviews was attained through the various deck logs
of the ships involved.
exist.

Unfortunately some deck logs do not

Of all the ships in the operation, only the deck log

of the USS Essex (CVA 9) is missing from the Record Center
of the National Arch' res.

Based on information gathered

from the staff at the National Archives, the CIA made an
attempt to clear all files dealing with the operation.

All

paperwork and documents concerning the operation were
supposed to be turned over to Kennedy Administration
officials and the CIA.

Some institutions were less than
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willing to agree.

The deck logs that still remain have the

ship's position block erased and the words "Special
Operations" written in it.

Yet, the USS Elokomin (AO 55)

deck logs clearly state their its geographical position and
the names of the ships that it refueled which made it easy
to pin-point the location and composition of the task force.
Much of the information from the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library and John F. Kennedy Library is still closed.

Of the

information open to researchers, some of Eisenhower's
personal papers, the Taylor Report, and McGeorge Bundy's
Papers were the most valuable.

The sensitive classification

of the majority of the information dealing with the Bay of
Pigs and the relationship between the U.S. and Cuba is the
primary reason for the lack of information available.
Secondary sources provided a good background of
information, pro and con.

The doting histories of the

Kennedy Administration, Kennedy by Theodore Sorenson, and A
Thousand Days, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., gave detailed
accountings of the Kennedy days.

As insider's accounts of

the Kennedy Administration, these works tended to be biased
in favor of their subject.

Sorenson and Schlesinger's works

balance well Victor Lasky's JFK:

The Man and the Myth.

Lasky tried to peel through the Kennedy mystique to give a
differing opinion of the President and his Administration.
Although differing in nature, these sources were examples of
the secondary sources that were abundant and that provided a
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well-rounded scope of information.
Sources ranging from personal interviews, oral
histories, and government documents, to books, magazines,
and newspapers were instrumental in the support of my
thesis.
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